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MORALITY AND SECURITIES FRAUD 
JAYME HERSCHKOPF* 
Securities fraud features prominently in conversations about financial 
reform, and for good reason.  In addition to the disproportionate number of 
securities fraud lawsuits and government actions filed every year, securities 
fraud case law is frequently consulted as an analytical aid for other types of 
corporate fraud.  And yet, in discussing the interpretation and application of 
the securities laws, scholars, judges, and lawmakers alike have largely 
overlooked a feature of securities fraud that could offer significant assistance 
in many challenging areas: namely, that securities fraud, including civil 
securities fraud, has a pronounced moral dimension. 
This Article explores the role that moral judgment plays in the development 
and application of the law of civil securities fraud.  It argues that civil securities 
fraud is a morally charged concept, and liability for securities fraud is a 
pronouncement of moral blameworthiness.  Recognizing this moral dimension 
offers both descriptive clarity about the development and application of 
securities fraud liability, and prescriptive guidance for judges, litigants, and 
lawmakers navigating the often fraught landscape that is securities fraud law 
today.  On a broader stage, the morality of civil securities fraud offers new 
ideas for principled legal reform and explorations of new methods of fraud 
prevention. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Morality and big business are not concepts that have intertwined 
comfortably in recent years.  As scandal after scandal plague the financial and 
commercial industries, many have lost faith that governments can effectively 
regulate and police corporate activity.  New rules and regulations are 
promulgated, lawsuits are filed, and civil and criminal penalties rise, but 
commentators ponder whether demonstrations of compliance and fair dealing 
are no longer valued in corporate culture.1  Increasingly, companies appear to 
flock toward methods of demonstrating their values and integrity that are more 
 
1. See, e.g., Julian J. Z. Polaris, Note, Backstop Ambiguity: A Proposal for Balancing Specificity 
and Ambiguity in Financial Regulation, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 231, 235–37 (2014); see also 
JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION: HOW INTEGRITY HAS BEEN 
DESTROYED ON WALL STREET (2013) (arguing that reputation is no longer critical to success in the 
financial industry and tracing how this transformation occurred). 
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prominent, but also more isolated, such as commercials, donations, and social 
responsibility initiatives.2 
We as a society are struggling with the purposes of corporate regulation and 
the meaning of corporate penalties.  This Article contends that a return to the 
fundamental questions of right and wrong can offer fresh insights into these 
issues.  And securities fraud, which has become one of the most popular ways 
for the government and private citizens alike to pursue corporate wrongdoing, 
is a sensible starting point.3 
This Article argues that we should regard liability for civil securities fraud 
as a pronouncement of moral blameworthiness.  Recognizing this moral 
dimension offers insight into how securities fraud has been developed and 
applied.  More importantly, the morality of securities fraud can offer guidance 
for judges, litigants, and legislators tackling challenging issues in securities 
fraud today. 
Of course, the role that morality plays, or should play, in law has been a 
fertile area of scholarly debate for many decades.  The most famous of these 
debates is likely the 1958 exchange between H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller in 
the pages of the Harvard Law Review.4  Hart, the legal positivist, argued in the 
tradition of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin that morality did not and should 
not play a role in understanding the law as it is.5  Fuller, taking up the natural 
law mantle from forbears like Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius, and Matthew 
 
2. See, e.g., Jivas Chakravarthy et al., Reputation Repair After A Serious Restatement, 89 ACCT. 
REV. 1329, 1330 (2014) (discussing successful steps accounting firms take to repair reputations after 
scandals); Sapna Maheshwari, Super Bowl Commercials Feature Political Undertones and Celebrity 
Cameos, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/business/media/commercials-super-bowl-51.html 
[https://perma.cc/FN4K-SNCV] (highlighting Super Bowl commercials by Coca-Cola, Airbnb, and 
Budweiser that promoted diversity and multiculturalism, seemingly in the face of the recent executive 
travel ban); Devin Thorpe, Why CSR? The Benefits of Corporate Social Responsibility Will Move You 
to Act, FORBES (May 18, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://onforb.es/13D6brf [https://perma.cc/XSJ7-C5V9] 
(interviewing CEOs discussing the corporate benefits of CSR). 
3. See, e.g., Sonia A. Steinway, Comment, SEC “Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly,” But 
What Do They Say? A Critical Analysis of the SEC’s New Enforcement Approach, 124 YALE L.J. 209, 
230–32 (2014) (questioning whether rising SEC monetary penalties actually promote its core 
purposes). 
4. See generally H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 593 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. 
L. REV. 630 (1958). 
5. See generally Hart, supra note 4, at 594–97. 
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Hale, argued that law has an implicit internal morality, one that plays an 
important role in its application.6 
The contours, terminology, and characters of the Hart-Fuller debate have 
all changed over the past sixty years, but its core points still resonate and inform 
legal scholarship and policy today.  Criminal law scholars in particular have 
devoted considerable time and insight to explicating how the making of moral 
judgments can inform nearly every facet of law’s creation, enforcement, and 
interpretation.7  They have shown that a law’s moral element plays one of two 
primary roles.  First, when a moral dimension is widely recognized, its analysis 
can offer guidance for enhancing a law’s consistency and efficacy.8  And 
second, analyzing that dimension in laws that might appear morally neutral 
offers the additional advantage of enabling a fuller opportunity to examine, 
criticize, and perhaps reform the assumptions and norms the law contains.9 
Similar, if less sizable, scholarly attention has been devoted to the moral 
judgments that suffuse legal rule and decision making in civil law.  Such studies 
run the gamut in topic, approach, and conclusions, but at their core, these studies 
are united in their belief that taking notice of the presence (or absence) of moral 
underpinnings in civil laws is advantageous.10  Be it as a descriptive or 
prescriptive aid (or both), understanding the role of morality can assist 
lawmakers in creating laws that achieve the goals they are designed for, and 
courts in interpreting those laws in a principled and effective manner. 
 
6. See Fuller, supra note 4, at 645 (outlining his theory of law and morality).  See generally R. 
H. Helmholz, Natural Law and Human Rights in English Law: From Bracton to Blackstone, 3 AVE 
MARIA L. REV. 1 (2005) (providing discussion of early natural law proponents). 
7. See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1473–77 (1995); 
Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—but Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 
128–130 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Ignorance of Law]; Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle 
in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375, 377 (1999).  But see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, at x (1999) (arguing against the use of moral theory 
in legal interpretation). 
8. Kahan, Ignorance of Law, supra note 7, at 154. 
9. Id. 
10. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1849 (2007); William Patry, The Role, or Not, of Ethics and Morality in Copyright Law, 37 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 445 (2011); Phyllis Schlafly, The Morality of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 31 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95 (2008); Peter H. Schuck, The Morality of Immigration Policy, 45 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 865 (2008); Loren A. Smith, The Morality of Regulation, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 507 (1998).  Among the most famous of such studies is Charles Fried’s theory of 
contract law with a moral basis in what he calls “the promise principle.” See CHARLES FRIED, 
CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 1 (1981); see also Charles Fried, 
The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 1 (2007) (offering a partially updated 
theory that takes into account recent economics literature). 
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This Article joins this tradition by examining the moral implications of civil 
securities fraud.  The moral dimension of securities fraud developed from the 
offense’s origins in common-law fraud and presents most prominently in 
securities fraud’s heightened mental element requirement, scienter.11  
Recognizing this moral dimension offers both descriptive clarity about 
securities fraud’s development and application, particularly the evolution of the 
private fraud action, and also prescriptive guidance for judges and litigants 
navigating the often fraught landscape that is securities fraud today.  The moral 
component of securities fraud has implications for pressing questions like 
pleading strategies, assessments of reckless conduct, evidentiary rulings, and 
the threat of overcriminalization. 
This Article draws on an existing body of scholarship elucidating the moral 
dimensions of regulatory regimes, including work on securities fraud.12  It 
moves that conversation forward in a number of ways.  First, the framework 
used to contour the moral dimension of securities fraud outlined in Part II can 
be used as an analytical tool in other areas of law as well, well beyond the 
securities laws.  Second, rather than limiting itself to a single type of securities 
fraud or cause of action, this Article applies its framework to all causes of action 
in the 1933 and 1934 securities acts that address fraud and fraud-adjacent 
activity.  This approach contrasts with the majority of work done on morality 
in securities law, which takes insider trading as its focus.13  Such work is 
obviously valuable; insider trading has become “a [powerful] totemic 
symbol . . . in branding the American securities markets as supposedly open 
and fair.”14  But because insider trading is often a criminal action, and because 
of its singularity within the securities law system,15 it is not the most effective 
 
11. See Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of Insider 
Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 436–37 [hereinafter Langevoort, Fine Distinctions]. 
12. I am particularly indebted to the extensive work of Donald Langevoort and Samuel Buell on 
this topic. 
13. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501, 507 (2004) [hereinafter Green, Moral Ambiguity] (calling insider 
trading an offense that “even in the most hard-core cases[] is not universally viewed as morally 
wrongful”); Strudler & Orts, supra note 7, at 377 (arguing that the moral element of insider trading 
can be useful for hard cases); David A. Wilson, Outsider Trading—Morality and the Law of Securities 
Fraud, 77 GEO. L.J. 181, 193 (1988) (examining courts’ and commentators’ reliance on moral 
assertions in insider trading cases). 
14. See Langevoort, Fine Distinctions, supra note 11, at 433. 
15. The singularity of insider trading within securities fraud more generally consists of, among 
other features: action (trading) rather than speech (misrepresentations) as the focus of actionable 
conduct; the higher likelihood of individual, rather than corporate, prosecution; and the heightened 
media attention such actions receive.  In addition, though the source of insider trading liability is 
technically Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the contours of that liability are so 
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means to understand the role of morality in the securities laws more generally.  
This Article provides a more generalized theory of morality’s place in the 
securities laws. 
Third, and finally, this Article offers extended treatment of how judges, 
litigants, and legislators can use the moral dimension of securities fraud in 
approaching specific issues in securities law.16  The financial collapse of 2008 
and its aftermath has provided securities scholars with renewed motivation to 
tie their work to the securities cases in court today; this Article gladly takes up 
that task. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part II explains what it means to label 
a cause of action morally charged, and explores this moral dimension in 
traditional common-law fraud.  Drawing from extensive scholarship on this 
topic in criminal law, this Part explains that one of the clearest ways morality 
can infuse civil law is when a law places prominence on the blameworthy 
behavior of the actor, rather than the need to compensate the victim.  This Part 
shows that in the realm of fraud generally, it is the heightened mental element 
requirement, preserved in the securities laws as “scienter” or intent to deceive, 
that most clearly displays the laws’ culpability-focused moral element. 
Part III analyzes civil securities fraud more specifically so as to show the 
character and development of its moral dimension.  It provides an overview of 
where fraud provisions are found in the securities laws, with particular focus 
on Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the principal antifraud 
provision in securities litigation.  It also offers historical context, showing the 
role that morality played in the securities laws’ passage and later significant 
amendments, and in the Supreme Court’s contouring of the Section 10(b) 
private cause of action. 
Parts II and III having established theoretical and descriptive support for 
the moral dimension of civil securities fraud, Part IV then explores the 
ramifications and advantages of recognizing the role that dimension plays.  It 
moves from specific pleading and evidentiary issues facing judges and litigants 
to more general questions of policy and legal reform involving lawmakers and 
the public.  This Part focuses particular attention on pleadings, because of the 
practical reality that many securities fraud cases are either dismissed at this 
 
far removed from the statutory text as to be completely judicially created.  See Steve Thel, Taking 
Section 10(b) Seriously: Criminal Enforcement of SEC Rules, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 30 
[hereinafter Thel, Taking Section 10(b) Seriously]. 
16. My focus is primarily how this moral dimension can inform decision rules, which are 
directed at those in the legal system and address how to decide legal questions.  Conduct rules, which 
are directed at society at large and address proper behavior, is a separate question this Article does not 
address.  See Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2039 (2006) 
[hereinafter Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud]. 
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stage or settle shortly thereafter, and on the concept of recklessness.  The moral 
dimension of securities fraud can offer judges a helpful lens by which to assess 
hard questions of intent, along with confidence that their rulings align with the 
purposes of the securities fraud and a less burdensome caseload in the longer 
term.  It can offer plaintiffs new avenues to pursue their objectives most 
efficiently, and defendants new ways to present their defenses most 
convincingly.  It can offer lawmakers a foundation upon which to amend the 
securities laws moving forward, and the corporate community new ideas for 
how to prevent fraud. 
II. CIVIL SECURITIES FRAUD AS MORAL JUDGMENT 
That civil securities fraud has a moral element is not intuitive.  Nor is it 
intuitive that a law’s moral element should play any role in jurisprudence, even 
if one recognizes its presence.17  This Part explores the contours of civil 
securities fraud’s moral dimension: its deontological emphasis on the wrongful, 
blameworthy behavior of the perpetrator independent of its outside 
consequences.18  This dimension, clear in criminal law, inhabits many areas of 
civil law as well. 
This Part uses scholarship from criminal law to explore a moral dimension 
tied to culpability, and offers two elemental indicators for when that dimension 
might be present in civil law as well: the presence of punitive damages and a 
heightened mental element requirement. 
This Part continues by moving from the general to the specific and looking 
at fraud in the common law.  Traditional fraud has a clear moral dimension, one 
that manifests most tellingly in its mental element requirement.  Fraud’s 
immorality rests in its nature as deception, a link largely preserved in securities 
fraud causes of action today.  It will be the work of the remaining Parts to show 
how the moral dimension of traditional fraud is retained in modern civil 
securities fraud and how it affects that law today. 
 
17. See POSNER, supra note 7, at x. 
18. This is not to say that morality does not play a role in other ways—it certainly does.  In 
particular, Michael Moore points out an equally robust moral dimension of criminal law to culpability 
that he labels “wrongdoing,” which is focused on the act rather than the perpetrator.  See Michael S. 
Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 319, 320–21 (1996).  This distinction will not 
be taken up in this Article, but Moore’s theories of wrongdoing are fertile ground for advancing the 
inquiry some scholars have started—how the causation showing of securities fraud (and other types of 
fraud) has moral implications.  See, e.g., Strudler & Orts, supra note 7, at 385. 
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A. What Does It Mean to Call a Law Morally Charged? 
1. A Focus on the Wrongful Perpetrator, Not the Wronged Victim  
When considering the moral dimension of the law, criminal law is the 
obvious starting point.  It is widely recognized that criminal law includes a 
moral element, that criminal charges denounce the proscribed activity as not 
only harmful, but wrongful.19  Criminal law is characterized by, among other 
things, the severity of its sanctions (including the possibility of imprisonment), 
the presence of the state as a party rather than the individual victim, and the 
existence of a permanent criminal record.  
A principal purpose of criminal punishment is deterrence, the prevention of 
future bad behavior.20  But another component is retribution or just deserts, 
which justifies punishment as an expression of community outrage and an 
appeal to notions of fairness and justice.21  Criminal punishment condemns the 
perpetrator for contravening established social norms, and so much of the moral 
weight of criminal law results from its inquiry into the culpability of the 
defendant him or herself.22  “Culpability focuses on the actor, not on the 
act . . . .”23 
This understanding of morality is deontological rather than utilitarian.  That 
is, the morality expressed in culpability in criminal law is not tied solely to an 
act’s consequences; the act itself can be declared wrong without primary 
reference to objective harm that it might produce in comparison with another 
 
19. See Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform 
the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 159 (2001) [hereinafter 
Green, Lying] (“Even those writers . . . who reject legal moralism in the [old] sense, agree that conduct 
must be more than merely harm-producing in order to be criminalized; it must also involve some form 
of moral wrongfulness.”); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 349, 363 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Social Influence] (writing that criminal law “can express 
meanings directly by taking positions that, in the context of extant social norms, signify particular 
valuations”).  Of course, there is also robust conversation surrounding overcriminalization, including 
a concern that the government is criminalizing behavior that lacks moral blameworthiness. See, e.g., 
Paul J. Larkin Jr., A Mistake of Law Defense as a Remedy for Overcriminalization, 28 CRIM. JUST. 10, 
10–13 (2013).  I will return to this concern in Part IV. 
20. See, e.g., Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 19. 
21. See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 69–75; see also Paul H. 
Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 243–44 (1982) 
(distinguishing four primary aims to criminal liability—“just punishment, general deterrence, special 
deterrence, and rehabilitation”—and explaining that just punishment involves “the public 
condemnation of the offender and his conduct”). 
22. See Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 19, at 384. 
23. Moore, supra note 18, at 319. 
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course of action.24  Traditional deontologists have no qualms about declaring 
what is “right” without reference to what is beneficial.25 
That is not to say that we are justified in criminalizing behavior simply 
because it violates a notion of inherent morality.  That line of argument, found 
in traditional legal moralism, often leads down deeply problematic paths.26  And 
indeed, scholars point out that retributive and condemnatory punishment can 
have utilitarian results, such as reinforcing respect for the law and thus 
encouraging general adherence.27  But that does not mean that strict harm 
prevention is the only justification for criminalization, or that failure to identify 
a utilitarian result necessitates the elimination of punishment.28  The lesson 
retained from traditional legal moralism is that applying the law necessitates 
the making of moral judgments, even if actors in the law are ambivalent about 
acknowledging such moralizing.29 
In contrast, the civil law system’s principal purpose has long been 
recognized as being to compensate, not condemn.30  The focus is not on the 
perpetrator and what she did wrong, but rather, on the harm suffered by the 
victim and to what extent he deserves compensation.31  Traditional civil law is 
the law of the private action, where individuals can avail themselves of the legal 
system to make themselves whole.32  Civil law “prices”; “criminal law 
prohibits.”33 
It bears emphasizing that this division between criminal punishment and 
civil compensation speaks only to the primary focus of each type of law—the 
 
24. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1–3 (1982). 
25. Id.; ALAN DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY 17–31 (1977). 
26. See generally 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS 
WRONGDOING 124–75 (1988).  The rise and fall of sodomy and blasphemy laws offer good 
illustrations.  See id. at 126–27.  
27. See Robinson, supra note 21, at 243–44. 
28. That would be the argument of legal moralism’s traditional alternative, liberalism.  See 
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 73, 75 (1995). 
29. See Kahan, Ignorance of Law, supra note 7, at 153. 
30. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the 
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193–94 (1991) 
[hereinafter Coffee, Unlawful]; Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between 
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1796 (1992). 
31. See Coffee, Unlawful, supra note 30, 193–94. 
32. See id. 
33. Id. at 194.  See generally Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: I, 43 
COLUM. L. REV. 753 (1943) (parsing the traditional distinctions between civil and criminal law with 
focus on the moral component of the latter); Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: 
II, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 967 (1943) (same).  
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“dominant tendency” that explains their elements and structure.34  This is not 
to say that criminal law never concerns itself with compensating those wronged, 
or that civil law never has a punitive component.  Quite the contrary, there is a 
robust model of restitution in our criminal law system, and countless examples 
of sanction and condemnation in the civil.  In other words, our legal system is 
no longer (and likely never was) one where blameworthiness mandates criminal 
sanctions.35 
Even more importantly, certain areas of law have long been recognized as 
inhabiting a middle ground between civil and criminal law where the traditional 
divisions break down.  So-called “hybrids” are commonly found in regulatory 
statutes where “precisely the same conduct can give rise to either criminal or 
civil penalties,” based largely on prosecutorial discretion.36  The charging 
question often hinges in part on an assessment not only of how culpable the 
activity is, but also the most effective way to deter others from similar actions 
in the future.37  Indeed, while deterrence sometimes goes by other names in the 
civil realm, there is no doubt that many civil laws have deterrence as a primary 
goal—not least regulatory schemes.38  In 2017, the Supreme Court held that one 
purpose of SEC-brought civil securities cases is deterrence, which can only be 
a punitive government objective.39 
Civil actions with a moral dimension do still focus on compensation.  
However, they also integrate features of the criminal law.  In determining 
liability under these actions, it is not only harm to the victim that is assessed, 
but also culpability—the blameworthiness of the perpetrator.40  Liability often 
comes with an enhanced dimension of punishment, as well as a heavy dose of 
societal condemnation.41  In other words, violators of civil actions with a moral 
dimension are deemed not just liable, but wrongful.42 
 
34. See Coffee, Unlawful, supra note 30, at 194 n.4. 
35. See id. at 213. 
36. See Green, Moral Ambiguity, supra note 13, at 514; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms 
Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1875, 1879 (1992); Coffee, Unlawful, supra note 30, at 201.  
37. See Coffee, Unlawful, supra note 30, at 224. 
38. The presence of deterrence as a stated goal is so prevalent in civil law these days that it is a 
poor gauge by which to measure the presence of a moral dimension.  Ultimately, how society views 
the behavior being deterred is what signals a moral element, rather than the presence of a deterrent goal 
itself. 
39. See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643–44 (2017). 
40. Coffee, Unlawful, supra note 30, at 211. 
41. Id. at 201. 
42. Id. 
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2. Identifying Civil Actions with a Moral Dimension 
Just as the division between criminal and civil is often blurrier than first 
appears, the division between morally charged and morally neutral actions can 
be hard to define.  Often, the moral element of a civil law is more a question of 
degree than of kind.43  Nor is this division static.  As society’s attitudes and 
priorities change, something that was once a relatively neutral regulatory matter 
can transform into something that violates fundamental community standards, 
and, consequently, moral condemnation begins to play a heightened role in its 
enforcement.44  And just as this Article draws attention to an area of law that 
others may dismiss as morally neutral, there are moral dimensions to many 
areas of law that may not be initially obvious.45 
That being said, there are certain signals that a law has a moral dimension 
premised on the culpability of the perpetrator, and that this dimension plays a 
role in the law’s application.  I offer two.  While neither feature is necessary or 
sufficient to deem a cause of action morally charged in this way, they are both 
good indicators that something more than compensation is at play, and that 
identifying this background player might prove helpful in elucidating the law. 
The first and most obvious indicator of a moral dimension to a civil law is 
the availability of punitive remedies: sanctions, fines, and damages.  Punitive 
damages in particular, designed to implement many of the same purposes as 
criminal punishment, are widely recognized as carrying moral censure.46  
Punitive damages feature prominently in common law as well as in federal 
statutes.47  Other sanctions, like suspension or revocation of a license or 
registration, tend only to be available when the government brings the action, 
 
43. Id. at 238–39. 
44. Id. (offering unlawful toxic dumping as one such example). 
45. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find a law for which it would be impossible to argue 
that moral implications exist.  But see Kahan, Ignorance of Law, supra note 7, at 146–47 (arguing that 
criminal tax provisions do not embody moral norms independent of the law itself); Jacob S. Sherkow, 
Patent Infringement as Criminal Conduct, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 10 (2012) 
(arguing that patent law is devoid of moral purposes). 
46. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 490–92 (2008) (discussing the roots 
of punitive damages as being in part “justified as punishment for extraordinary wrongdoing”); BMW 
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (measuring appropriateness of punitive damages 
against “the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct”). 
47. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012) (mandating treble damages for certain antitrust 
violations); 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012) (mandating treble damages for racketeering violations); see 
also Mann, supra note 30, at 1796–98 (discussing punitive damage awards under common law and 
federal statutes). 
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which emphasizes the public interest in the case and that social norms are being 
contravened.48 
The second indicator of a moral dimension to a civil law is the presence of 
a heightened mental element requirement.  The criminal corollary is mens rea—
the “guilty mind” requirement.49  One of the three principal functions of the 
mens rea requirement is “to ascribe a level of moral blameworthiness to a 
defendant who commits a particular act.”50  Just as a finding of mens rea leads 
to criminal culpability, so too is the presence of a heightened mental element in 
a civil action a good indication that liability will be accompanied by a 
declaration of culpability, which, as explained above, is “a transparently moral 
concept,”51 and by extension a moral judgment.  A heightened mental element 
requirement plays a critical role in identifying morally charged sections of the 
securities laws, an exercise that will be undertaken in Part III. 
B. The Traditional Moral Dimension of Fraud 
There is another important way to identify a law’s moral dimension, and 
that is to look to its origins.  Whether they be common law or statutory, most 
laws have at least one clear ancestor from which they either naturally evolved 
or were intentionally fashioned.52  And while the end product may differ 
dramatically from the parent, certain features do linger in unexpected ways, 
including, often, a moral element. 
Unlike the indicators discussed in the previous Section, looking at a law’s 
origins for the presence of a moral dimension is necessarily an individualized 
 
48. See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643–44 (2017) (“[W]hether a sanction represents a 
penalty turns in part on ‘whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public, or a wrong 
to the individual.’” (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892))).  
49. Green, Moral Ambiguity, supra note 13, at 512. 
50. Sherkow, supra note 45, at 12.  The other two principal functions are (1) “to differentiate 
between those acts requiring private compensation . . . as opposed to societal retribution,” id., and (2) 
“to shield people against punishment for apparently innocent activity.”  Id. (quoting Staples v. United 
States, 511 U.S. 600, 622 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).  The fact that the presence of mens rea 
can establish blameworthiness is one reason why courts and legislators alike are so eager to read or 
insert mental elements into crimes where the moral wrongfulness is not immediately apparent; there is 
latent discomfort in criminalizing behavior that is not obviously wrongful.  See Green, Moral 
Ambiguity, supra note 13, at 512; John Shepard Wiley Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: 
Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1022–23 (1999). 
51. See Strudler & Orts, supra note 7, at 385 n.35.  But see Sherkow, supra note 45, at 39–41 
(warning against reading moral condemnation into civil mental state requirements where it is not 
aligned with statutory purpose). 
52. See, e.g., STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND 
POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690–1860, at 1–2 (1998) (introducing centuries of securities regulation that 
informed twentieth-century American securities laws). 
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exercise.  This Section focuses on one source of civil securities fraud—
common-law fraud—to illustrate this larger analytical point, and also to provide 
specific support for this Article’s main argument.  Common-law fraud contains 
a moral element inherently tied to the mental state of the accused, and that 
element is preserved in securities fraud today. 
The moral dimension of fraud predates its codified illegality.  Dante 
devoted the entire Eighth Circle of Hell to those who committed fraud (frode), 
its position indicating that he considered only traitors more blameworthy.53  
Fraud, at its core, is a type of deception, and it is that deception that encapsulates 
fraud’s immorality.54  To deceive is to infringe on another’s autonomy: to 
willfully alter another’s mental processes by skewing the truth.55  Whether the 
deception leads to material harm is irrelevant from a deontological point of 
view; the deception itself is the wrong committed.56 
Fraud’s development from sin to legal wrong closely tracks commercial 
development generally.  Early common law strongly promoted caveat emptor, 
expecting consumers to exercise prudence to prevent themselves from being 
cheated.57  It was only after commercial transactions became increasingly 
complex in the seventeenth century that courts and lawmakers began to 
recognize the need for more comprehensive and flexible definitions of 
liability.58  The new laws needed to account both for customers’ current 
vulnerability and for the practical reality that more innovative fraudulent 
practices were always in development.59  This ultimately led to the broad fraud 
causes of action we know today.60 
 
53. See DANTE ALIGHIERI, LA DIVINA COMMEDIA—INFERNO Cantos XI, XVIII-XXX (La 
Nuova Italia 3d ed. 1985).  Dante conceived of hell as a pit of nine concentric circles, each punishing 
a different kind of sinner.  The circles were ordered from least to most blameworthy, with the deepest, 
the Ninth Circle of Hell, reserved for traitors like Judas Iscariot.  Id. at Cantos XXXII-XXXIV.  
54. See Commonwealth v. Tuckerman, 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 173, 203 (1857) (“In fraud there is 
always some kind of deception.”); Strudler & Orts, supra note 7, at 408. 
55. See James Edwin Mahon, A Definition of Deceiving, 21 INT’L J. APPLIED PHIL. 181, 181 
(2007); see also Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Autonomy and Benevolent Lies, 18 J. VALUE INQUIRY 251, 256, 
265 (1984) (highlighting the link between deception and autonomy).  For additional discussion on the 
immoral nature of deception, see CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 54–78 (1978) and Joseph 
Kupfer, The Moral Presumption Against Lying, 36 REV. METAPHYSICS 103 (1982). 
56. The immorality of interfering with autonomous choices also aligns with much utilitarian 
theory.  See FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 55, at 33, 60. 
57. Green, Lying, supra note 19, at 160. 
58. Id. 
59. See Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, supra note 16, at 1972–73, 1988. 
60. Id.; Green, Lying, supra note 19, at 183–85. 
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There can be no deception without intent to deceive.61  Therefore, it should 
come as no surprise that one of the key elements of a fraud claim traditionally 
was evidence of wrongful intent.62  Since the specific actions that amounted to 
fraud were constantly evolving, wrongful intent was a way to proscribe various 
forms of fraudulent activity with a single law without it becoming dangerously 
overbroad.63  The Supreme Court recently confirmed the moral dimension of 
nineteenth-century fraud and its link to intent in construing the term “actual 
fraud” in the Bankruptcy Code: 
“Actual fraud” has two parts: actual and fraud.  The word 
“actual” has a simple meaning in the context of common-law 
fraud: It denotes any fraud that “involv[es] moral turpitude or 
intentional wrong.”  “Actual” fraud stands in contrast to 
“implied” fraud or fraud “in law,” which describe acts of 
deception that “may exist without the imputation of bad faith 
or immorality.”  Thus, anything that counts as “fraud” and is 
done with wrongful intent is “actual fraud.”64 
Actual fraud’s traditional association with moral turpitude was heavily tied into 
its intent element.   
 This is not to say that every fraud action in our law today retains a moral 
dimension.  Even within the securities laws there are provisions designed to 
prevent fraud that lack a heightened mental element and, consequently, are 
much more distanced from moral condemnation.  The presence of implied and 
constructive fraud actions, as well as other types of misrepresentation actions, 
reflect a widespread understanding in our law that there are reasons other than 
moral condemnation to label something fraud and to attach liability.65  
 
61. Green, Lying, supra note 19, at 163. 
62. See id. at 160–63. 
63. See id. at 183–85. 
64. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1586 (2016) (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1878)); see also Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, 
Securities Fraud Litigation, and the Supreme Court, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 611, 622 (2008) (pointing out 
that when Congress passed the securities laws in the 1930s, “virtually every existing body of fraud 
jurisprudence imposed liability upon those who knowingly participated in a fraud”).  Seminal fraud 
opinions from the United Kingdom from the same period as Neal also required the showing of a 
“wicked mind” for fraud liability to attach.  See Le Lievre v. Gould [1893] 1 QB 491 at 498 (Eng.) 
(discussing Derry v. Peek [1889] 14 HL 337); see also William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, 
and Recklessness Under the Federal Securities Laws, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 121, 154 (1997) (citing Derry 
v. Peek [1889] 14 HL 337 at 347) (explaining the Derry opinion as one where “the House of Lords 
held that in an action for deceit, the false statement must be made fraudulently, that is, with some 
element of moral dishonesty”). 
65. For example, reasons for the constructive fraud cause of action include preventing 
wrongdoers from benefitting from those wrongs, regardless of intent, and promoting good faith 
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However, those types of fraud that do have a heightened intent requirement 
align closely with traditional common-law fraud, and so bring with them the 
same moral condemnation.66 
When the civil law departs from its traditional goal of victim compensation 
and moves instead toward a focus on an individual’s culpable behavior, it leaves 
the realm of pure moral neutrality.  Liability and punishment under such laws 
have a moral dimension, recognized or otherwise, and the presence of punitive 
damages or a heightened mental element requirement are both good indicators 
that this threshold has been crossed.  In the case of common-law fraud, the 
heightened mental element ties civil fraud to its origins as sinful behavior 
premised on deceit, and thus embodies the moral dimension of the misconduct.  
The next Part will show to what extent traditional fraud’s origins play a role in 
securities fraud today. 
III. CIVIL SECURITIES FRAUD AS MORALLY CHARGED 
Civil securities fraud is morally charged.  Finding someone liable for 
securities fraud is not just about compensation, but about condemnation and 
punishment.  Judges and juries look not just to whether a victim was harmed, 
but whether a perpetrator deceived.67  Liability is gauged not just with reference 
to the harm done to individual victims, but the harm done to the public as a 
whole through the wrongful contravention of established social norms.68  Using 
the securities laws to find someone liable reflects the public’s commitment to a 
background of political morality, and brings with it a judgment that the 
wrongdoer’s actions have offended that morality. 
This Part takes as its focus the moral dimension of civil securities fraud in 
the context of both the present securities laws and their statutory and 
jurisprudential history.  It begins by identifying what constitutes securities fraud 
and where the relevant causes of action can be found within the securities laws.  
This exercise emphasizes those securities actions that require a showing of 
 
conduct in business dealings.  See Jeffrey A. Monhart, A Primer on the Developing Doctrine of 
Constructive Fraud in Montana, 52 MONT. L. REV. 153, 155–56 (1991). 
66. Suggesting such a high threshold for actionable core fraud is not undisputed.  In the securities 
context, for instance, Donald Langevoort asserts that a speaker’s awareness of falsity (and not a motive 
to mislead) is all that is required for a finding of securities fraud.  See Donald C. Langevoort, 
Reflections on Scienter (and the Securities Fraud Case Against Martha Stewart that Never Happened), 
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 5–10 (2006) [hereinafter Langevoort, Martha Stewart].  It is likely that 
we are in closer agreement than might first appear, particularly given that Langevoort’s focus is insider 
trading.  See id. at 6 & n.16 (appearing to include intent to deceive in his definition of awareness).  
67. See, e.g., Kuehnle, supra note 64, at 148. 
68. See, e.g., Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 
FLA. L. REV. 1103, 1117 (2008). 
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scienter, i.e., a knowledge of wrongdoing, for liability to attach.  The scienter 
element can be used to parse which sections of the securities laws constitute 
morally charged fraud. 
This Part then looks to the historical context of the securities laws’ passage 
and later significant amendments, as well as the Supreme Court cases that 
contoured securities fraud into what we know it as today.  This history shows 
that while the moral dimension of securities fraud was not an inevitable product 
of these events, the passage of the securities laws was certainly morally fraught, 
and the fraud provisions, as ultimately construed by the Supreme Court, have 
become an expression of that moral dimension. 
A. What is Securities Fraud? 
Just as arguing that a law contains a moral dimension necessitates 
contouring that dimension, arguing that civil securities fraud contains a moral 
dimension necessitates a particular understanding of what the term “civil 
securities fraud” encompasses.  Different sources label “antifraud” provisions 
in the securities laws differently, and only some such provisions have a 
pronounced moral dimension under the reasoning elucidated in Part II. 
This Section begins by offering a brief overview of the principal securities 
fraud provision, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 
10b-5 promulgated thereunder.69  These two texts are the bases of most 
securities fraud actions, and heavily inform our understanding of securities 
fraud in other sections of the securities laws.  Unsurprisingly, one element of a 
Section 10(b) fraud action is scienter, “a mental state embracing intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”70 
The presence of a heightened mental element requirement like scienter is 
the simplest way to identify that subset of securities fraud provisions which is 
morally charged.  It is this heightened mental element that reflects a culpable 
state of mind and, by extension, moral judgment.71  Only those causes of action 
that require scienter or a similar mental component reflect the type of moral 
judgment with which this Article concerns itself, and so “civil securities fraud” 
refers only to those actions.  Other sections of the securities laws may be labeled 
“antifraud” in other settings and for other purposes, but they lack a heightened 
mental element and, consequently, the moral dimension under discussion here.  
This Section also offers a preliminary consideration of the Securities and 
 
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017). 
70. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 & n.12 (1976). 
71. The other indicator from the previous Part, punitive damages, will also be discussed.  See 
supra Section II.A.2; infra Section III.A.3. 
HERSCHKOPF - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 2 (FINAL 2.7.18).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/18  1:06 PM 
2017] MORALITY AND SECURITIES FRAUD 469 
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) role in securities litigation as an expression of 
public mores. 
1. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
When scholars or practitioners discuss securities fraud, first and foremost, 
they mean actions brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.72  These two passages, 
the focus of so much attention, are surprisingly short.  Section 10(b) states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by 
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce 
or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange- 
. . . . 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security registered on a national securities 
exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-
based swap agreement any manipulative or deceptive device 
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations 
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.73 
The meaning of “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” has been 
of particular significance in later case law, as discussed below.74 
Section 10(b) can be violated only derivatively; for liability to attach, there 
must exist “rules and regulations” prescribed by the SEC and contravened by 
the defendant.75  The primary of these rules is Rule 10b-5, enacted in 1942 and 
designed to encompass as broad a scope as allowable under Section 10(b).76  It 
states in full: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
 
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.  I refer throughout this Article to cases or claims 
brought under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 as “Section 10(b)” cases or claims. 
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
74. See infra Section III.B.2. 
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
76. See 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 541–42 
(Thomas Reuters 7th ed. 2016); see also Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public 
Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 
530–31 (1990) [hereinafter Langevoort, SEC] (criticizing the SEC for continuing to avoid adopting 
bright-line rules to keep its jurisdictional scope at a maximum). 
HERSCHKOPF - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 2 (FINAL 2.7.18).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/18  1:06 PM 
470 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:453 
securities exchange, 
 (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
 (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit  to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
 (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon 
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.77 
Again, the phrases “device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” and “operate as a 
fraud or deceit” will be important moving forward.78 
Neither the statute nor the administrative rule spell out the elements of a 
cause of action for securities fraud.  Instead, these sections have spawned one 
of the largest judicially created bodies of federal law.  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
called Rule 10b-5 “a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a 
legislative acorn.”79  For both the statute and the administrative rule, the 
elements are the same.  Those bringing a section 10(b) private suit must prove, 
in connection with the sale or purchase of a security: 
(1) that the defendant made a materially false statement or  
 omission; 
(2) that the defendant acted with scienter; 
(3) that the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation or 
 omission; 
(4) that the plaintiff suffered economic loss; and 
(5) that the plaintiff’s loss was caused by the material 
 misstatement or omission.80 
When bringing section 10(b) actions, the SEC does not need to prove the last 
three elements for liability to attach.81 
2. Other Provisions of the Securities Laws 
In addition to Section 10(b) actions, scienter is also an element in a number 
of other actions brought under the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities 
 
77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017) (emphasis added). 
78. See infra Section III.A.2. 
79. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
80. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
81. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980); SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 
1993). 
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Exchange Act of 1934.82  These include, most prominently, Section 17(a)(1) of 
the Securities Act of 1933, which prohibits the employment of “any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud” in connection with the offer or sale of 
securities.83  Section 17(a) is in many ways the Securities Act equivalent of 
Section 10(b), but the Supreme Court has held that only the first subsection 
requires scienter.84 
Additional securities actions that require scienter or a similar mental 
component include private actions under Section 9(a) of the Exchange Act,85 
which prohibits creating the false impression of active trading,86  Section 14(e) 
of the Exchange Act,87 which prohibits misstatements and fraud in connection 
with tender offers,88 and Section 15(c)(7) of the Exchange Act,89 which 
prohibits the knowing or willful making of false written statements in 
connection with the offer or sale of government securities.90  Section 18 of the 
Exchange Act,91 which prohibits false filings, makes it the defendant’s 
responsibility to show a lack of culpable mind, and so also involves scienter, 
albeit with a burden shift.92 
Other sections of the securities laws that are often described as antifraud 
provisions lack a scienter requirement and so lack the moral dimension this 
 
82. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a–77aa); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78oo). 
83. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (2012). 
84. See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697. 
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1). 
86. See id.; AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 616 (7th Cir. 2011); Connolly v. Havens, 
763 F. Supp. 6, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 203 
(3d Cir. 2001) (comparing Section 9(a)’s provisions to 10(b)’s). Section 9(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f) 
(formerly Section 9(e)), creates a private right of action against anyone who “willfully” violates 
Sections 9(a)–(c).  The Supreme Court has indicated this language constitutes a scienter requirement.  
See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 295–96 (1993) (citing Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 209 n.28 (1976)); see also Ray v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 
624 F. Supp. 16, 19 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (including scienter as a requirement under Section 9(e)). 
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). 
88. See In re Digital Island Sec. Litig., 357 F.3d 322, 328 (3d Cir. 2004). 
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(7). 
90. This section was added in 1993 as part of the Government Securities Act Amendments, Pub. 
L. No. 103-202, § 110, 107 Stat. 2344, 2353 (1993), and does not appear to have been used in any 
federal court decision. 
91. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a). 
92. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 296 (1993) (stating 
that Section 18 “involve[s] defendants who have violated the securities law with scienter”); Dekalb 
Cty. Pension Fund v. Transocean Ltd., 817 F.3d 393, 405–06 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that Section 18(a) 
requires knowing misrepresentation). 
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Article analyzes.  For example, scienter is not currently understood to be 
required for liability under Sections 17(a)(2)–(3) of the Securities Act, which 
prohibit “obtain[ing] money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading” and “engag[ing] in any transaction, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the 
purchaser” in connection with the offer or sale of securities.93  Nor is scienter 
required for liability under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, which 
prohibit false or misleading statements in certain securities filings.94  Liability 
attaches under Section 11 to registration statements “contain[ing] an untrue 
statement of a material fact or omitt[ing] to state a material fact required to be 
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading,”95 
while Section 12(a)(2) proscribes prospectuses and oral communications used 
to sell securities that “include[] an untrue statement of a material fact or omit[] 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”96  
This division, between moral and amoral, scienter and no scienter, closely 
tracks one made in fraud scholarship generally, which contrasts so-called 
“core” fraud actions with lesser types of misrepresentation, where liability still 
attaches, but not the same condemnation.97  Core fraud actions are more closely 
aligned with traditional common-law fraud, whose moral dimension was 
explored in Part II.98  Misrepresentation actions move further away from that 
origin, and consequently generally do not require an intent showing.99 
Dividing securities fraud actions according to scienter requirements is not 
completely neat.  For one, what constitutes fraud for the purposes of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)100 does not turn on the requisite 
 
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(2)–(3). 
94. Id. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2).  In addition, Section 12(a)(1), id. § 77l(a)(1), offers damages to those 
who purchase securities from defendants who did not comply with the registration or prospectus 
requirements of the Act.  It is widely understood as a strict liability action, and so is not popularly 
considered an antifraud provision.  See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 638 (1988). 
95. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). 
96. Id. § 77l(a)(2).  There are other causes of action under the securities laws, notably under 
Sections 16 and 20 of the Exchange Act, but since these tend not to be considered fraud provisions 
they will not be discussed. 
97. See Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 526–40 (2011) 
[hereinafter Buell, What is Securities Fraud?]. 
98. Supra Part II. 
99. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, supra note 97, at 532. 
100. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737. 
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mental element.  The PSLRA, which applies to private securities class actions, 
provides its own description of what constitutes “securities fraud actions,” and 
that description closely tracks the misrepresentation language of Sections 11 
and 12(a)(2) and does not include mention of a mental element.101  Instead, the 
PSLRA implies that actions requiring “proof that the defendant acted with a 
particular state of mind” form a subset of securities fraud actions.102 
Furthermore, the scienter requirements of various sections of the securities 
laws are usually not clear from the statutory language.  In many instances, case 
law is the source of the scienter requirement.103  This can make it difficult to 
determine whether a scienter requirement is always necessary under a particular 
provision or only under certain circumstances (such as private actions versus 
administrative actions), and also means that the scope of securities fraud’s 
moral dimension is not static; it changes as additional provisions come under 
scrutiny.104 
These challenges do not mean that the exercise of focusing on securities 
actions with a scienter element is futile.  The inconsistency raised by the 
PSLRA is one of nomenclature rather than substance.  What counts as fraud for 
purposes of pleading does not preclude a subset of morally charged actions 
within it.105  We have already seen that fraud is itself a dynamic concept, 
evolving to encompass behavior as it is deemed wrongful by society.106  Indeed, 
one reason that Rule 10b-5 continues to be used is its unusual ability to adapt 
to changing social understandings and norms regarding the securities 
industry.107  That courts might continue to elucidate new places where a mental 
 
101. See id. § 21D(b)(2), 109 Stat. at 746–47; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (describing the actions 
the section covers as those “in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant- (A) made an untrue 
statement of a material fact; or (B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading”).  
102. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 21D(b)(2), 109 Stat. at 746–47; 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (stating that such actions require that the plaintiff “state with particularity facts giving 
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”).  This stands in 
contrast with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which provides heightened pleading requirements 
for allegations of fraud, but specifically states that “conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged 
generally” rather than “with particularity.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
103. See, e.g., Dekalb Cty. Pension Fund v. Transocean Ltd., 817 F.3d 393, 405–07 (2d Cir. 
2016); see also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 21D(b)(2), 109 Stat. at 746–47. 
104. For instance, the scienter element of Section 18(a) was only recently elucidated in the 
Second Circuit.  See DeKalb Cty. Pension Fund, 817 F.3d at 405–07. 
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b). 
106. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, supra note 16, at 1976; see also supra Section II.B. 
107. See Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S7, 
S7–S8 (1993) [hereinafter Langevoort, Rule 10b-5]. 
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element plays a role, and thus where a moral dimension rests, only reinforces 
this point.108 
3. SEC Enforcement Actions 
SEC-brought securities fraud actions present an interesting category for the 
purpose of examining the securities laws’ moral dimension.  On the one hand, 
the scienter analysis this Section offers is true regardless of whether an agency 
or private party brings the action, suggesting the participation of the SEC is 
irrelevant to the morality assessment.  On the other hand, SEC involvement 
suggests even more moral questions are at play than in a pure private action.  
Governmental participation in a civil action often highlights a public 
interest in preventing the action at issue,109 aligning it more closely to the social 
norm preservation goals of criminal law.  Admittedly, the ever-expanding 
regulatory regime—along with differing societal values attached to the 
behavior under examination—makes government participation generally a poor 
indicator of a moral element at play.110  But in the case of the SEC, its stated 
goals of protecting investors and the integrity of the markets take on a distinctly 
moral sheen.111 
The SEC’s role in securities fraud offers a few particular features.  For 
instance, punitive damages are generally not available for securities fraud 
unless coupled with another statute allowing them, like the Racketeering 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).112  However, the SEC is 
allowed to impose civil fines in some instances, including, notably, for willful 
 
108. It should be noted that when courts hold that a mental element requirement is present, it 
tends to narrow, rather than broaden, the original cause of action.  In other words, fewer people become 
liable under the clarification, rather than more.  For instance, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 
185, 193 (1976), whose holding that scienter was a requisite element of Section 10(b) actions ultimately 
resulted in the dismissal of the suit against the defendant.  Thus, as with the mental element requirement 
in traditional fraud, scienter in securities fraud avoids the potential problem of defendants being found 
liable under uncertainly drawn lines. 
109. See, e.g., Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643 (2017); United States v. Borden Co., 347 
U.S. 514, 518–19 (1954). 
110. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
111. See What We Do, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [https://perma.cc/9TH9-CTND] (last visited Dec. 20, 
2017).  Of course, the SEC’s focus on investment protection could also be read the other way, as 
highlighting the compensatory nature of securities fraud.  For instance, since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
the Commission has the power to use monetary judgments, including punitive ones, to compensate 
victims.  See Winship, supra note 68, at 1118–21. 
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012) (stating those suing under RICO “shall recover threefold 
the damages [they] sustain[],” though noting that securities fraud itself cannot establish a RICO 
violation).  
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violation of the securities laws.113  Penalties, when they are available, increase 
based on factors that could be read as linked to levels of culpability, and 
consequently, moral judgment.114 
Additionally, as Donald Langevoort points out, there are situations where 
the Supreme Court seems to accept that liability outcomes will differ in SEC 
enforcements and private litigation.115  He postulates that this is due to the 
extraordinarily high damages that can attach to the latter, which are often 
disproportionate to defendants’ actual culpability.116  It is not in the scope of 
this Article to address these ideas, beyond to emphasize that recognizing a 
moral dimension to securities fraud that hinges on scienter does not by any 
means exclude its presence in other elements. 
B. Securities Fraud’s Moral Dimension in Historical Context 
The moral dimension of civil securities fraud is in line with the moral 
feeling surrounding the passage of the securities laws and their later significant 
amendments, as well as the Supreme Court case law that transformed Section 
10(b) from a short vague provision into the litigation Mjolnir117 we know today.  
Our current antifraud regime is not the inevitable product of the securities laws’ 
historical context; the laws could have easily evolved in other ways with other 
enforcement priorities.  Nor was the moral dimension a principal focus of the 
laws’ drafters.118  But the rhetoric of morality has played a pronounced if diffuse 
role in the passage and amendment of the securities laws.  Examining this 
history through the gloss of moral judgment shows the role that morality has 
 
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(a)(1)(A) (2012).  The other main basis for civil penalties is a party’s 
failure to heed a cease-and-desist order.  See id. §§ 77t(d), 78u-2(a)(2).  Punitive damages are also 
available in some cases of insider trading.  See Joseph A. Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 69 BUS. LAW. 307, 351 & n.236 (2013). 
114. See Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to 
Reliance and Third-Party Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2128 (2010) 
[hereinafter Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully].  But see Winship, supra note 68, at 1118–19 
(noting that the Fair Fund provision under Sarbanes-Oxley does not distinguish between penalty types 
for purposes of compensation). 
115. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully, supra note 114, at 2128. 
116. See id.; see also Strudler & Orts, supra note 7, at 385 (focusing on causation, which is also 
not part of an SEC action). 
117. Considered one of the most devastating weapons in existence, the hammer of Thor, Norse 
god of thunder, seems an eminently fitting metaphor for Section 10(b) today.  See DAVID LEEMING, 
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WORLD MYTHOLOGY 266–67 (2005). 
118. See generally Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 385, 414–24 (1990) [hereinafter Thel, Original Conception]. 
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already played in shaping securities fraud jurisprudence, and will continue to 
play moving forward. 
1. Statutory Origins 
Securities legislation “has historically been the product of calamity.”119  
Both the original securities acts, passed in 1933 and 1934, and their later 
significant amendments, have come in the wake of economic disasters.  The 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were passed in 
response to the stock market crash of 1929.120  What actually caused the crash, 
and whether the crash was the principal cause of the subsequent Great 
Depression, matters less than the fact that the public believed the two were 
intimately intertwined, and that unregulated speculation and Wall Street 
manipulators were to blame.121  Church leaders dubbed the businessmen 
involved in the crash gamblers and hucksters,122 suggesting that they had failed 
the nation not just economically, but morally as well.  As America bid adieu to 
the prosperity of the roaring 20s, hemlines lengthened, outfits sobered, and the 
desire to upend the old moral regime dissipated in favor of exhibits of restraint 
and virtue.123 
The main thrust of the new securities laws was full and accurate disclosure, 
reflected in the famous quotation of then-future Justice Louis Brandeis: 
“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 
policeman.”124  The registration and disclosure requirements that form the bulk 
of the securities laws, as well as the creation of the SEC by the Securities 
Exchange Act, were all aimed primarily toward ensuring those involved in the 
 
119. Id. at 407.  Thel’s words are particularly prescient as they predate the financial upheavals 
of 2000 and 2008, which, as he predicted, led to additional securities regulation.  See infra notes 131–
34 and accompanying text. 
120. Id. at 408. 
121. See id. at 408–09 & nn.97–98 (offering contemporaneous examples). 
122. See Robert J. Shiller, Listen Carefully for Hints of the Next Global Recession, N.Y. TIMES 
(April 29, 2016), https://nyti.ms/1TjuTYO [https://perma.cc/28FA-7ZLH]. 
123. Id.  Consumer spending in the United States plummeted in the year after the market crash.  
See Christina D. Romer, The Nation in Depression, 7 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 19, 29–31 (1993).  The 
rate of spending declines was higher than in similarly situated countries, and contributed greatly to the 
depression’s growing severity.  Id.  No doubt, the uncertain economic climate and individuals’ losses 
were the principal causes of this trend, but the moral dimension counseling against demonstrations of 
excess and frivolity should not be ignored. 
124. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (8th ed. 
1932).  Interestingly, despite the widespread use of this quotation, disclosure was not actually 
Brandeis’s main focus in the book.  He was much more concerned about the concentration of economic 
power and addressed his banking reform theories to that area.  See Thel, Original Conception, supra 
note 118, at 406 n.90. 
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securities markets had full and accurate information at their disposal.125  Private 
remedies existed as well, which allowed individuals to be compensated when 
they traded on material misrepresentations, but again, these were considered 
another way to encourage broad and accurate disclosures.126  While there are 
plenty of references to the prevention of fraud as a broad statutory purpose,127 
there was little explication of how it was to be effected.  The vagueness of the 
antifraud provisions was justified in part as a means to avoid offering a 
blueprint for fraudsters.128 
The minutiae of regulation often stand in marked contrast with the 
sweeping rhetoric used to pass laws, and the securities laws were no exception.  
Both during his campaign and in public statements surrounding the laws’ 
enactment, President Franklin Roosevelt made repeated references to the 
morally destructive nature of speculation as the reason for the securities laws, 
and promised a moral and ethical reform of Wall Street to restore investor 
confidence.129  Members of Congress similarly made repeated references to the 
hucksters who caused the crash, the “widows and orphans” who were the 
hapless victims of securities fraud, and the need for new laws to protect them.130 
 
125. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (“A fundamental 
purpose, common to [the early securities] statutes, was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for 
the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities 
industry.”). 
126. See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and 
Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 680–81 (2014). 
127. See, e.g., SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 117 
(1941), https://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1940.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KKG-D8TY] (“The 
Securities Act of 1933 is designed to compel full and fair disclosure to investors of material facts 
regarding securities publicly offered and sold in interstate commerce or through the mails.  Its 
provisions are also designed to prevent fraud in the sale of securities.”). 
128. Both courts and the SEC have continued to be cautious about specifying what specific 
behavior constitutes securities fraud, offering as explanation the desire both to avoid providing a 
blueprint and also to prevent loopholing.  See Langevoort, SEC, supra note 76, at 530–31; Kahan, 
Ignorance of Law, supra note 7, at 138–40.  Some are skeptical of these purported reasons.  See, e.g., 
Langevoort, SEC, supra note 76, at 531 (pointing out “the dominance of lawyers in policymaking roles 
at the SEC” and arguing that one result is “an impenetrable admixture of highly technical securities 
law” only readable by experts).  Regardless, this reality makes the development of a robust scienter 
requirement all the more important as a means by which to prevent overbreadth of application. 
129. See Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation with Securities Fraud, 61 ALA. L. REV. 61, 65 (2009); 
Thel, Original Conception, supra note 118, at 425–26, 425 nn.174–76.  For a full article devoted to 
the moral purpose behind the securities laws’ passage and early years, see John H. Walsh, A Simple 
Code of Ethics: A History of the Moral Purpose Inspiring Federal Regulation of the Securities 
Industry, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015 (2001). 
130. See Sam Thypin-Bermeo, Comment, The S.E.C. and the Damsel in Distress: A Contextual 
Analysis of the Duty of Best Execution, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 169, 174–75 (2015) (collecting 
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The modern day economic scandals that led to significant amendments to 
the securities laws have similarly been discussed in moral terms; “[c]ommercial 
and financial crises are intimately bound up with transactions that overstep the 
confines of law and morality . . . .”131  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act came in the 
wake of the accounting scandals of 2001 and 2002,132 the Dodd-Frank Act in 
2010 in response to the financial collapse of 2008.133  The legislative history 
surrounding these amendments is replete with references to “the greed and 
recklessness of Wall Street,” and the need to both keep such behavior in check 
and to punish it when particularly egregious.134  It should come as no surprise 
then that both acts amended the securities laws to include more instances of 
both criminal and civil fraud liability, the latter focused particularly on reckless 
behavior.135  These statutes also strengthened the SEC’s and Department of 
Justice’s (DOJ) enforcement powers, rather than those of private litigants, 
reflecting a longstanding legislative trend in securities law favoring 
government enforcement.136 
The stated political motivation for legislative enactment is not generally 
used to interpret specific passages of the resulting law.  However, as an 
expression of social norms imbued into a law, political motivation can be an 
invaluable indicator of underlying statutory purposes.137  One big reason the 
securities laws came into existence, and likely why they successfully passed, 
was their stated goal of policing morally problematic behavior.138  “[T]hey 
 
examples).  Thypin-Bermeo also points out that in the years leading up to the crash, women had become 
an important investor population, though one viewed as incompetent, irrational, and easily preyed upon 
by dishonest brokers, which added a further moral dimension to the securities laws.  See id. at 172–75. 
131. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL 
CRISES 73 (4th ed. 2000). 
132. See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis, 
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95, 96 & n.3 (2004). 
133. See 155 CONG. REC. H14,760 (daily ed. December 11, 2009) (statement of Rep. Kilroy). 
134. See, e.g., id.; 107 CONG. REC. H4,692–93 (daily ed. July 16, 2002) (statement of Rep. 
Roukema); see also Ronald J. Colombo, Book Review, Exposing the Myth of Homo Economicus, 32 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 737, 737–38 & nn.1–6 (2009) (collecting op-ed excerpts in wake of 2001–
2002 scandals). 
135. See Grundfest, supra note 113, at 350–51, 385 n.424. 
136. Id. at 351; see also Khanna, supra note 132, at 103–17 (arguing that corporate crime 
legislation is particularly popular with lawmakers because corporate players prefer it to other types of 
regulation, and so offer less opposition). 
137. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1270–
75 (2001) (showing how statutes allow for the evolution of constitutional norms). 
138. Ann Morales Olazábal, Defining Recklessness: A Doctrinal Approach to Deterrence of 
Secondary Market Securities Fraud, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1415, 1417. 
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reflect a strong public desire for corporate accountability.”139  Beyond aspiring 
to prevent a repeat occurrence of such crises, the securities laws were passed in 
an environment keen to root out wrongdoing among corporate professionals.  
This purpose, then, may aid judges confronting close questions of legal 
interpretation, as Part IV details. 
2. Judicial Interpretation of Section 10(b) 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, under which the bulk of securities fraud 
actions are brought today, is something of a statutory outlier.  As we have 
already seen,140 its text is minimal. Section 10(b) also had minimal legislative 
history surrounding it, due in part to the fact that it could not be rendered 
effective until the SEC promulgated a rule under it.141  The SEC promulgated 
Rule 10b-5 in 1942, which was similarly sparse and passed with similar lack of 
fanfare.142  When the SEC’s commissioners were asked to approve the rule, it 
is said that the only comment made was one of them quipping, “Well . . . we 
are against fraud, aren’t we?”143  It is unlikely that any of them realized just 
how widely used the rule would be—and for what manner of behavior.144 
Section 10(b) and the other antifraud provisions were clearly meant to 
complement what already appeared in the securities laws, but how they were 
meant to do so is the subject of significant debate.145  What is not controversial 
is that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were intended to offer additional protection 
over what was already covered by common-law fraud.146  This was due in part 
to the recognized remedial nature of the securities laws, particularly in those 
 
139. Id. at 1448. 
140. See supra Section III.A.1. 
141. The generalized fraud provision in the Securities Act, Section 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) 
(2012), is much more rarely used and similarly barebones.  See supra Section III.A.1. 
142. Ray Garrett, Jr. & W. McNeil Kennedy, Conference on Codification of the Federal 
Securities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 922 (1967). 
143. LOUIS LOSS ET AL., 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1289 (6th ed. 2011) 
(quoting Garrett & Kennedy, supra note 142, at 922). 
144. Steve Thel argues that the main purpose of Rule 10b-5 when it was passed was to prohibit 
securities fraud by purchasers, filling in a hole from Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, which only 
prohibited deceptive acts by sellers.  See Thel, Taking Section 10(b) Seriously, supra note 15, at 27–
28.  This, according to him, is why no one expected that the rule would be particularly noteworthy.   
Id. 
145. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983). 
146. Id.; Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(b) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: The 
Merits of Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under a Structuralist Approach, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 
71, 133; Kevin R. Johnson, Liability for Reckless Misrepresentations and Omissions Under Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 667, 684 (1991). 
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causes of action brought by the SEC, which were litigated in the public interest.  
Furthermore, the section was designed to be flexible, reflective (at least in part) 
of the fact that fraud by its nature is constantly evolving.147  Scholars also agree 
that there were multiple legal ancestors of Section 10(b), including not only 
common-law fraud, but also state blue sky laws and the federal mail fraud 
statute.148  Scholars disagree regarding the significance of these sources for 
Section 10(b) interpretation.149 
It is case law, particularly that of the Supreme Court, that took these 
statutory sources and purposes and transformed them into explicit causes of 
action.150  Supreme Court cases began to make the scienter element of securities 
fraud more explicit in the 1970s and 80s, particularly in Section 10(b)’s implied 
private right of action.  The Court has also repeatedly emphasized the 
significance of the common-law roots of securities fraud as justification for 
using common-law principles to aid in the interpretive task.151  Those cases that 
treat scienter and clarify the contours of causes of action under the securities 
laws highlight the connection between securities fraud and traditional common-
law fraud, and how common-law fraud—and its moral dimension—has played 
a role in justices’ assessment. 
The Supreme Court has not taken a consistent interpretive approach to 
deciding cases concerning the scope of Section 10(b).152  Some scholars have 
accused the Court of recharacterizing its jurisprudence to render it more 
consistent than it actually is, as a method to justify shifting interpretive 
preferences and policy goals.153  Whether or not this is an accurate assessment 
of the Court’s actions and motives, what is true is that Section 10(b)’s 
 
147. See Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 386–87. 
148. Prentice, supra note 64, at 621–22.  Blue sky laws are state laws that regulate the sale of 
securities, typically by requiring sellers of new issues to register their offerings and provide financial 
details.  Id.  
149. See id.  All the progenitors of Section 10(b) had a moral dimension to them, and the mail 
fraud statute in particular was applied primarily with moral considerations in mind in the early years.  
See id. at 675. 
150. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005); Chiarella v. United States, 
445 U.S. 222, 227–29 (1980). 
151. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 344; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227–30. 
152. See generally David M. Phillips, An Essay: The Competing Currents of Rule 10b-5 
Jurisprudence, 21 IND. L. REV. 625 (1988) (tracing different strands of 10(b) interpretative 
philosophy). 
153. See, e.g., Fallone, supra note 146, at 88–95 (focusing in particular on Central Bank of 
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)); see also Langevoort, Rule 10b-5, 
supra note 107 at S11–S15 (showing that Supreme Court jurisprudence in the 1960s through 80s was 
also affected by shifting public understandings of the purpose of securities regulation). 
HERSCHKOPF - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 2 (FINAL 2.7.18).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/18  1:06 PM 
2017] MORALITY AND SECURITIES FRAUD 481 
interpretation was quite fraught in Supreme Court case law of the 1970s, 80s, 
and 90s.154 
That fraught history is due not only to justices’ differing understandings of 
the purposes behind the securities laws (reflected in lengthy dissents in many 
key cases),155 but also to the fact that the private right of action under Section 
10(b), the focus of many of these cases, is implied, and not explicit.156  The 
Supreme Court is now much less likely to infer private causes of action than it 
once was, and so the Court’s Section 10(b) jurisprudence is further complicated 
by having to face the remnants of a practice no longer as acceptable.157  
Furthermore, because the Supreme Court did not first rule on the nature of 
Section 10(b) until 1971, it had almost three decades of lower court 
jurisprudence with which to contend; in many instances, that case law continues 
to be binding.158 
The first reported decision that recognized a private right of action under 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 appeared in 1946.159  In Kardon v. National 
Gypsum Co., the district court relied on the Restatement of Torts and one 
previous Southern District of New York case to conclude that since the 
complaint before it clearly alleged a behavior that violated Section 10(b), and 
since Section 10(b) was clearly enacted (at least in part) to protect interests of 
individuals like the plaintiff, Section 10(b) must contain a private remedy for 
the plaintiff.160  This holding was consistent with the general view in federal 
courts at this time that “every wrong shall have a remedy,” and that this remedy 
should include a private right of action in addition to governmental enforcement 
authority.161  The private right of action under Section 10(b) was adopted by an 
 
154. Langevoort, Fine Distinctions, supra note 11, at 431–33. 
155. Id. at 442 & n.47 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997)).  
156. Id. at 441 n.40. 
157. See Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 195–96 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Langevoort, Fine 
Distinctions, supra note 11, at 436.  The implied nature of the Section 10(b) private action also makes 
it more prone to accusations that its changes are the product of shifting policy goals and changes in 
interpretive methods.  Id. 
158. Steven Thel, Section 12(2) of the Securities Act: Does Old Legislation Matter? 63 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1995) [hereinafter Thel, Section 12(2)]. 
159. Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
160. Id. (citing Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (1941)); see also Herman & 
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 & n.10 (1983) (recounting the history of the implied private 
right of action under 10(b)). 
161. See Grundfest, supra note 113, at 322–24 (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Sci.-
Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 176 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  
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“overwhelming consensus of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals” before 
ultimately being endorsed by the Supreme Court in 1971.162 
In 1975, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Cort v. Ash that made it 
much more difficult to read statutes as implying private rights of action.163  
While this holding did not render previously implied private actions moot, those 
actions were met with extreme skepticism moving forward.164  In some 
instances, the Court began to narrow the dimensions of those private rights of 
action that “Congress did not authorize when it first enacted the statute and did 
not expand when it revisited the law.”165 
In Section 10(b)’s case, this happened quickly and dramatically.  In the 
decade following Cort v. Ash, numerous Supreme Court opinions continued to 
refine the contours of Section 10(b), often choosing the narrower of potential 
interpretations.166  These cases, and other cases interpreting the antifraud 
provisions in this period, are based on statutory language, despite the sparseness 
of that language where Section 10(b) is concerned.  They focus deep attention 
on the “manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” language of Section 
10(b)167 and whether or not similar language in other sections can be read as a 
corollary.168 
These opinions reflect the justices’ diverse understandings of the purposes 
of the fraud provisions and disagreement regarding how those purposes inform 
the interpretive task.  The cases tend to include lengthy dissents highlighting 
 
162. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Superintendent of Ins. 
of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). 
163. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).  The Court established four factors that must be 
considered “[i]n determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute”: (1) whether the plaintiff 
was intended to be benefitted specially from the statute; (2) whether the legislative intent offered any 
indication regarding a private right of action; (3) whether providing remedies for the plaintiff would 
be consistent with statutory purpose; and (4) whether the cause of action had been traditionally 
preempted by state law.  Id. 
164. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142 (2011). 
165. Id. (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 167). 
166. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472–75 (1977) (holding that mere 
fiduciary breach was not actionable under Section 10(b)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 
193 (1976) (holding that scienter was a requisite element of Section 10(b) suits); Blue Chip Stamps, 
421 U.S. at 731, 754–55 (holding that private Section 10(b) suits can be brought only by actual 
purchasers or sellers of securities). 
167. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).  
168. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980) (“Section 10(b) is aptly 
described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud.”); Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 
473 (“The language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not 
involving manipulation or deception.”). 
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such variance of opinion.169  The cases follow a general trend in securities law 
decisions of the past fifty years; the justices split 5–4 “with an unusually great 
frequency,” and with unusual and unstable distributions of the justices across 
that divide.170  In other words, the history of Section 10(b)’s judicial 
interpretation is plagued by a lack of clear principals. 
Some scholars have dedicated pronounced attention to arguing that Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were meant to cover an expansive amount of actionable 
activity, and so the Supreme Court has gotten it wrong.171  They use structural 
arguments, contemporaneous legislative and administrative materials, and early 
case law to make their points, with particular focus on advocating against 
further restriction of the Section 10(b) private cause of action.172 
It is not in the scope of this Article to evaluate the merits of these arguments.  
What matters is that for the past half century, defining the scope of securities 
fraud has been the province of the courts.  That is not likely to change, and 
whether or not one believes that the attendant body of law has a legitimate 
origin or consistent theory does not make it any less binding or real.173  Supreme 
Court jurisprudence has repeatedly narrowed the scope of Section 10(b) to the 
point that today, “fraud under Rule 10b-5 means real deception, nothing 
less.”174  Whatever the motivation of the justices, the antifraud provisions have 
 
169. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164, 198–99 (1994) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s holding that aider and abettor 
liability is not actionable under Section 10(b) with reference to the purpose of the section); Aaron v. 
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 704–09 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (using his 
understanding that the antifraud provisions “are key weapons in the statutory arsenal for securing 
market integrity and investor confidence” to argue against requiring scienter in actions brought by the 
SEC seeking equitable relief); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 761–62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority for using the “blunt chisels” of legislative history and policy considerations to 
support its holding). 
170. See Joseph A. Grundfest, We Must Never Forget That it is an Inkblot We Are Expounding: 
Section 10(b) as Rorschach Test, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 41, 45–53 (1995). 
171. See, e.g., Fallone, supra note 146, at 77–79; Ramirez, supra note 126, at 687–700; Thel, 
Original Conception, supra note 118, at 461. 
172. See, e.g., Fallone, supra note 146, at 133 (arguing that Congress should codify securities 
fraud jurisprudence); Ramirez, supra note 126, at 672–73 (criticizing Supreme Court jurisprudence for 
limiting private securities litigation); Thel, Original Conception, supra note 118, at 461 (offering a 
detailed analysis of contemporaneous views of Section 10(b) and more modern understandings of the 
reason for its passage); Thel, Taking Section 10(b) Seriously, supra note 15, at 46 (making similar 
arguments in the context of SEC authority under Section 10(b)).  But see Phillips, supra note 152, at 
630 (arguing that even in early 10b-5 cases the Supreme Court focused “primarily upon the conduct of 
the defendants” and “the investing public generally” rather than the actual plaintiffs in a case). 
173. See Thel, Section 12(2), supra note 158, at 1192. 
174. See Langevoort, Fine Distinctions, supra note 11, at 431 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. 
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977)). 
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been interpreted to closely align to traditional common-law fraud.175  As a 
consequence, the antifraud provisions also mirror the common law’s moral 
dimension. 
Understanding civil securities fraud as morally charged is not the only way 
to read the history of Section 10(b)’s enactment and Rule 10b-5’s later 
promulgation, but it also is not excluded by that history.176  More importantly, 
Supreme Court opinions from the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, which emphasize a close 
textual reading of these and other sections of the securities laws requiring 
scienter, do align the laws more closely with the common-law roots of fraud by 
emphasizing the language of intent and deception.177  Regardless of what 
happened historically, the moral dimension of fraud has been enshrined in the 
scienter requirement that now appears in multiple causes of action.  Now that 
the moral dimension of fraud is established, it can and should be used to support 
a more principled and coherent jurisprudence moving forward. 
IV. ADVANTAGES TO USING A MORAL LENS IN CIVIL SECURITIES FRAUD 
The moral dimension of securities fraud, premised in the culpability of 
those found liable, is a social norm that plays a variety of roles in the securities 
laws’ application.  Understanding those roles and acting with them in mind will 
make for better law, be it through more principled application or as incentive 
for reform.  The remainder of this Article devotes itself to showing how.178 
Sections A, B, and C, focus on three rather particular issues in securities 
law related to scienter: heightened pleading requirements, greed as a motive to 
establish scienter, and recklessness as satisfying a scienter requirement.  In each 
instance, recognizing the moral dimension of securities fraud can play a helpful 
role in legal analysis.  Particular attention is paid to the recklessness question, 
as it is the one currently proving most troublesome to judges and most 
multidimensional.  Sections D and E are more theoretical, devoting attention to 
how the moral dimension of civil securities fraud can inform jurisprudence, 
 
175. See Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 473; see, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 344; Chiarella 
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–29 (1980). 
176. Cf. Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 
(2000) (“At the time a statute is enacted, it may have a range of plausible meanings.  Over time, 
however, subsequent acts can shape or focus those meanings.”). 
177. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 473; Langevoort, Fine Distinctions, supra note 11, at 431–32. 
178. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Is Ignorance of Fact an Excuse Only for the Virtuous?, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 2123, 2127–28 (1998) (“Morally preachy law review articles can’t really make society better; 
only political organizing can.  One impediment to organizing, however, is that morally defective legal 
decisions frequently cloak themselves in mystifying abstractions . . . that deprive members of the public 
of a salient focal point for democratic deliberation.”). 
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statutory amendment, and legal reform, as well as offer incentive to look 
outside litigation for ways to prevent fraud.  All these Sections share a common 
thesis: that the moral dimension of civil securities fraud “provides a rational 
framework for judges, legislators, and administrators to deal with hard 
cases.”179 
A. Scienter’s Role in Heightened Pleading Requirements 
One area of movement in the securities laws, in which the moral dimension 
of fraud plays an explicit role, is the courts’ tendency to apply the heightened 
pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to factual fraud 
allegations in non-fraud sections of the securities laws.  Courts’ recognition of 
the moral dimension of securities fraud justifies their heightened inquiry when 
allegations of it appear. 
Rule 9(b) concerns allegations of “fraud or mistake,” and states that “the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake” must be “state[d] with 
particularity,” while “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a 
person’s mind may be alleged generally.”180  In non-class actions, Rule 9(b) 
remains the standard for securities fraud actions, though the PSLRA, which 
governs class actions, has a different standard that receives much more 
attention.181 
Courts have generally held that allegations brought under the sections of 
the Securities Act that forbid material misrepresentations but require no 
showing of a mental state, such as Sections 11 and 12(a)(2), do not fall under 
Rule 9(b).182  However, for a long time, confusion continued regarding what to 
do when claims “grounded in fraud”183 are brought under these sections.  If a 
Section 11 claim includes factual allegations of fraud: Should the heightened 
 
179. Cf. Strudler & Orts, supra note 7, at 377 (making the same point in the insider trading 
context). 
180. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
181. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), requires pleading a “strong 
inference” of scienter in “securities fraud actions,” a defined term in the statute and broader than the 
scienter-based definition this Article proposes.  See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 746–47 (1995); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1), (b)(2)(A) (2012).  As mentioned, 
this definition has been interpreted to include Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act.  See supra 
Section III.A.2.  The interpretation of “strong inference” is one of the most contested issues in federal 
securities law.  See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality 
Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 633 
(2002). 
182. In re NationsMart Corp. Secs. Litig., 130 F.3d 309, 315 (8th Cir. 1997). 
183. Id. 
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pleading requirement apply because of the subject matter, or not, because of the 
action pleaded?184 
Over the last fifteen years, circuits have generally adopted a standard first 
articulated by the Fifth Circuit: 
Where averments of fraud are made in a claim in which fraud 
is not an element, an inadequate averment of fraud does not 
mean that no claim has been stated.   The proper route is 
to disregard averments of fraud not meeting Rule 9(b)’s 
standard and then ask whether a claim has been stated.185 
In other words, when a plaintiff brings a non-fraud claim, but includes in 
support facts to establish the presence of fraud, those facts will still be assessed 
under Rule 9(b), and will be excised from consideration if they do not pass 
muster.  Courts are indeed relying on the factual allegations of a claim, rather 
than the type of claim alleged, to determine the appropriate pleading 
standard.186 
In explicating this rule, the courts of appeals express keen awareness that 
the moral judgment that attaches to “[f]raud allegations may damage a 
defendant’s reputation regardless of the cause of action in which they 
appear.”187  One of the reasons fraud must be pleaded with particularity under 
Rule 9(b) is “to protect potential defendants from the harm that comes to their 
reputations when they are charged with the commission of acts involving moral 
turpitude.”188  Courts’ recognition that accusations of fraud bring with them 
moral censure offers justification for these developments. 
 
184. See id. (collecting cases where courts have applied Rule 9(b) to Section 11 and 12 claims). 
185. Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky’s Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 368 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis 
added).  For cases all adopting the same standard, see Streambend Prop. II, L.L.C. v. Ivy Tower 
Minneapolis, L.L.C., 781 F.3d 1003, 1010–11 (8th Cir. 2015); Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 170–
71 (2d Cir. 2004); and Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1104–05 (9th Cir. 2003). 
186. Contra In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(refusing to apply Rule 9(b) pleading standards to Section 11 claims because “[w]hether Rule 8(a) or 
9(b) is triggered turns on the type of claim alleged (i.e., the cause of action) rather than the factual 
allegations on which that claim is based”).   
187. Rombach, 355 F.3d at 171 (quoting Vess, 317 F.3d at 1104). 
188. Gross v. Diversified Mortg. Inv’rs, 431 F. Supp. 1080, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing Segal 
v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir. 1972)); see also U.S. ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 
1385 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that Rule 9(b) “safeguards potential defendants from frivolous 
accusations of moral turpitude”).  Interestingly, the text of the rule does not focus on mental element 
requirements.  Instead, it states that only “the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake” must be 
“state[d] with particularity,” while “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s 
mind may be alleged generally.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  
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B. Greed as Motive for Scienter Showing 
The moral dimension of securities fraud is also valuable to consider when 
discussing the motive and opportunity test many courts accept as part of a 
successful scienter showing at the pleading stage.  Again, the moral component 
offers justification for certain case law developments, but it also provides 
insight regarding how the test might be applied in cases moving forward.189 
Under the motive and opportunity test, courts allow plaintiffs to allege facts 
evidencing the presence of a motive, in tandem with an opportunity to commit 
fraud, as evidence of scienter.190  The motive and opportunity test developed 
out of Second Circuit jurisprudence and has become widely used,191 though 
other circuits frequently emphasize that motive analysis is only relevant to a 
scienter inquiry, rather than dispositive. 
Plaintiffs alleging securities fraud often attempt to use evidence of greed to 
establish motive under the test, and there is frequent disagreement regarding 
what type of greed should satisfy the motive.  Some posited evidence of greed, 
such as an officer’s desire to retain his or her highly compensated job, earn a 
bonus, or keep a company profitable, is generally rejected by courts because it 
is the type of action required to be successful in business.192  It would be 
illogical to see such motivations as suggestive of foul play given that they are 
ubiquitous, and admired, in the industry at large.193 
Understanding scienter to imply moral wrongdoing does two things here.  
First, it offers clearer validation to use greed as evidence of motive in a scienter 
inquiry.  Not only is greed widely recognized as immoral in Western thought 
and American jurisprudence,194 but it has also formed one of the principal 
 
189. See supra Section IV.A. 
190. See Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 918–19 (2002). 
191. Id. (tracing the origins of the test to the mid-1980s); Ann Morales Olazábal & Patricia 
Sanchez Abril, The Ubiquity of Greed: A Contextual Model for Analysis of Scienter, 60 FLA. L. REV. 
401, 410–12 (2008) [hereinafter Olazábal & Abril, Greed] (showing circuits’ differing consideration 
of the motive and opportunity test in the context of the PSLRA); Ann Morales Olazábal, The Search 
for “Middle Ground”: Towards a Harmonized Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act’s New Pleading Standard, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 153, 169–71 (2001) (summarizing the 
state of the law after passage of the PSLRA). 
192. See Samuel W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime, 103 GEO. L.J. 547, 552–53 (2015) 
[hereinafter Buell, Culpability].  It is more or less required at this point to quote Gordon Gekko: “The 
point is, ladies and gentlemen, that greed—for lack of a better word—is good. . . .  Greed, in all of its 
forms . . . has marked the upward surge of mankind.  And greed . . . will not only save [this company], 
but that other malfunctioning corporation called the U.S.A.”  WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987). 
193. See, e.g., Acito v. IMCERA Grp., Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that 
allegations of officers’ motive to increase their pay was insufficient to establish scienter). 
194. See Olazábal & Abril, Greed, supra note 191, at 403 (collecting examples). 
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justifications for the securities laws in particular.195  Public perceptions of the 
financial collapses that presaged the securities laws and emendations often 
viewed greed as a cause, and so, as elucidated above,196 the need for an 
accounting of the greedy was written into the DNA of the laws that were 
passed.197  The legislative history surrounding Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank 
in particular makes numerous references to greed, often tying it to reckless 
behavior to paint a picture of a grossly irresponsible corporate industry that 
dragged the country into ruin in pursuit of a bottom line: “The greed and 
recklessness of Wall Street has cost Main Street dearly.”198 
Second, the moral dimension of fraud offers guidance on how to parse truly 
blameworthy greedy behavior from non-actionable motives, culpable conduct 
from that “adhering to what is essentially accepted as the social norm of [the 
defendants’] immediate peer group.”199  White collar crime often brings with it 
“moral complexity and uncertainty” because of the blurring of boundaries 
between wrongful and praiseworthy behavior in the commercial realm.200  What 
counts as acceptable aggressive dealing, as opposed to criminal fraud, is not 
always obvious or amenable to bright line-drawing.201  This dilemma extends 
to civil corollaries of such laws as well. 
Ann Morales Olazábal and Patricia Sanchez Abril have performed a close 
examination of how greed is used as motive evidence for scienter in the 
securities class action context, and have constructed a model for analyzing such 
 
195. See Langevoort, Fine Distinctions, supra note 11, at 434 (arguing that a central premise 
used to justify insider trading regulation was that greed threatened market integrity). 
196. See supra text accompanying notes 132–34. 
197. John Coffee succinctly labeled the 2008 financial collapse “a simple story of greed, 
rationalization, and sloth.” John C. Coffee, Jr., What Went Wrong? A Tragedy in Three Acts, 6 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 403, 403 (2009) [hereinafter Coffee, What Went Wrong?]. 
198. 155 CONG. REC. H14,760 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2009) (statement of Rep. Kilroy); accord 155 
CONG. REC. E2,943 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2009) (statement of Rep. Fattah) (“Many homeowners now find 
they are unable to meet their financial obligations due to the severe recession caused by the unbridled 
greed and recklessness of many financial services institutions.”); 107 CONG. REC. S6,528 (daily ed. 
July 10, 2002) (statement by Sen. McCain) (“We must make some fundamental changes in the current 
system of corporate oversight to protect Americans from avarice, greed, ignorance and criminal 
behavior.”); 107 CONG. REC. S7,426 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement by Sen. Biden) (“To restore 
some level of confidence, the accounting reform legislation we have passed is critical to stem the 
corporate greed threatening our economy.”). 
199. See Jed S. Rakoff, Conjoining “Recklessness” in Securities Fraud Cases to Moral 
Culpability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1447, 1453 (2013); see also Green, Moral Ambiguity, supra note 13, 
at 506 (“Many instances of alleged extortion, fraud, and similar offenses are difficult to distinguish 
from conduct that involves ‘merely aggressive’ business, litigation, or political behavior.”). 
200. Green, Moral Ambiguity, supra note 13, at 502. 
201. See Buell, Culpability, supra note 192, at 559. 
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evidence with reference to the magnitude, timing, and atypicality of the conduct 
at issue.202  For example, a complaint showing that a defendant’s stock trades 
were both unusually large compared to both characteristic sales in the company 
as well as to the defendant’s own trading history will likely fare better in 
arguing a motive for scienter.203 
Olazábal and Sanchez’s rubric is an excellent tool, but allowing a judge to 
consider evidentiary issues with reference to morality can offer a helpful 
additional lens.  Judges considering specific examples of greed can use the 
question of how blameworthy the behavior is in the context of the industry to 
distinguish ordinary human desires and business requirements from unusual 
attitudes that can point to something potentially actionable at stake.204 
C. Recklessness as Scienter in Civil Securities Fraud 
One of the most multidimensional ways in which recognizing the moral 
dimension of civil securities fraud can serve as a useful interpretive tool 
involves the place of recklessness in securities fraud.  While it is no longer 
controversial that recklessness can satisfy securities fraud’s scienter showing, 
questions such as what behavior qualifies as reckless, how recklessness must 
be pleaded, and what evidence can be used to prove recklessness, remain 
sources of confusion.205 
Understanding securities fraud as morally charged not only offers judges 
guidance with regard to certain findings connected to recklessness, but also 
links evidentiary conclusions to the constitutive law, giving judges more 
confidence that their rulings fit into the broader purposes behind the securities 
laws’ fraud provisions.  The result is a way to steer the law surrounding 
recklessness in a more coherent and principled direction while still functioning 
within the confines of existing precedent, even between circuits. 
1. The Recklessness Problem 
In order to understand the usefulness that the moral dimension of securities 
fraud can offer to the challenges raised by recklessness assessments, it is 
important, first, to understand the nature of those challenges.  While scienter 
 
202. See Olazábal & Abril, Greed, supra note 191, at 415–20. 
203. Id. at 413–15.  
204. See the following Section C for a more detailed explanation for how this lens can be used 
in recklessness assessments. 
205. See infra Sections IV.C.1.a, IV.C.2.a–b. 
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has been an established element of securities fraud for four decades,206 it has 
been less clear what that mental element encompasses.  Scienter is defined as 
“[a] mental state consisting in an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”207  
However, the contours of that definition are in dispute, chiefly regarding how 
recklessness fits into the definition.  In 1976, a Supreme Court footnote raised 
the possibility that recklessness might satisfy the scienter requirement in 
Section 10(b) actions as “a form of intentional conduct,” but the Court declined 
to rule on the issue.208  Since then, every court of appeals to address the issue 
has decided that recklessness does indeed satisfy the scienter requirement for 
10(b) actions.209  Given the strong effect that Section 10(b) case law exerts on 
other securities law jurisprudence, it would be safe to say that a similar 
understanding of scienter would inform wherever else it appears in the 
securities laws. 
a. A Missing Definition and Jurisprudential Inconsistency 
Unfortunately, what constitutes recklessness for purposes of securities 
fraud is still notoriously difficult to say.210  In part, recklessness assessments 
face the same problem that all scienter assessments do: the definition of scienter 
itself is a porous one, and the law’s state-of-mind rules can prove a poor 
corollary to how social scientists conceive of similar entities.211  In other words, 
the steps that a judge must take under the law to make a proper scienter 
assessment often bear little resemblance to how intent to deceive actually 
operates.  It certainly does not help matters that the meaning of recklessness in 
non-legal contexts bears little to no resemblance to intentionality.212 
Additional ambiguity arises from the variable definition of recklessness 
itself within the law.  Recklessness operates on a spectrum in our law.  
Sometimes it is best characterized as a “negligence plus” standard, and 
sometimes it is just a hair shy of actual intent to injure.213  Sometimes it is 
 
206. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 & n.12 (1976) (requiring scienter in 
private Section 10(b) actions); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691, 697 (1980) (requiring scienter in 
SEC-brought Section 10(b) actions and for claims brought under Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities 
Act). 
207. Scienter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
208. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. 
209. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007); see 
e.g., Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 343 (4th Cir. 2003). 
210. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 181, at 651. 
211. See Langevoort, Martha Stewart, supra note 66, at 2–3. 
212. See, e.g., Reckless, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) 
(“marked by lack of proper caution : careless of consequences”). 
213. See Johnson, supra note 146, at 687–95. 
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assessed objectively, based on what a reasonable person should have known 
under the circumstances, and sometimes it is subjective, requiring proof of what 
the defendant actually did know and nonetheless chose to ignore or acted in 
spite of.214  The Supreme Court has conceded in other contexts that recklessness 
is a concept that “cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition”;215 
it would seem that problem surfaces in securities fraud as well. 
There has been a great deal of scholarship devoted to various problems that 
the specter of recklessness raises in securities fraud.216  Donald Langevoort and 
Ann Olazábal, among others, have reviewed recent case law and demonstrated 
a complete lack of coherent standards, including within individual circuits, for 
how to make a recklessness determination in Section 10(b) cases.217  Circuits, 
wary of diluting the intent standard, are clearly uncomfortable with the lower 
forms of recklessness constituting scienter, and so they will refer to the standard 
as conscious recklessness, deliberate recklessness, severe recklessness, extreme 
recklessness, and similar phrasings, and sometimes will even offer a specific 
description or definition.218  But confusion persists.219 
When it comes to deciding whether a particular complaint has pleaded fraud 
with specificity, or if the evidence can show liability, there is little practical 
consistency.220  Judges (and juries) struggle with how to apply the definitions, 
vague or specific, to the case before them.221  No doubt, the fact that the vast 
majority of recklessness assessments happen at the pleading stage adds to the 
challenge.222  Only minimal facts are available at this point, leaving the inquiry 
necessarily in a more theoretical realm. 
 
214. See Kuehnle, supra note 64, at 161.  Kuehnle explains that the objective form of 
recklessness finds its source in tort law.  See id. at 181–84. 
215. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 
825, 836 n.4 (1994) (calling the concept of recklessness “nebulous”). 
216. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 146; Kuehnle, supra note 64; Ann M. Olazábal & Patricia S. 
Abril, Recklessness as a State of Mind in 10(b) Cases: The Civil-Criminal Dialectic, 18 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 305, 307 (2015) [hereinafter Olazábal & Abril, Recklessness]. 
217. See, e.g., Langevoort, Fine Distinctions, supra note 11, at 435–41; Olazábal, supra note 
138, at 1424–29; see also Kuehnle, supra note 64, at 179–81 (tracing some of the confusion back to 
the 1977 Seventh Circuit case, Sundstrand v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
218. Olazábal, supra note 138, at 1424–29. 
219. See Olazábal & Abril, Recklessness, supra note 216, at 320–24. 
220. See id. at 320–25. 
221. See id. 
222. The vast majority of securities fraud actions settle before summary judgment.  See Stefan 
Boettrich & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2016 Full-Year 
Review, NERA 21–27 (2017), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/URLs_Cited/OT2016/16-
373/16-373-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/QB78-8D6E].  
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b. Lower Standards for Criminal Conviction 
Perhaps even more troubling, if one takes a step back and considers that 
recklessness can also satisfy the mental element for criminal securities fraud 
liability, it appears that the threshold for evidence leading to criminal 
conviction is sometimes lower than that for civil.  Criminal cases that favor 
“circumstantial, objective-style assessments” over requirements of subjective 
knowledge showings can lead to convictions based on allegations that never 
would have passed muster at the pleading stage in a civil case in the same 
court.223 
2. Morality as an Offer of Guidance and Clarification 
Conceiving of securities fraud as a morally wrongful act confers a number 
of advantages to judges interpreting and applying the securities laws in 
instances where recklessness is at issue, and even, potentially, the lawyers 
involved.  It offers a basic yardstick for preliminary recklessness assessments.  
It also provides justification for requiring a higher showing for recklessness, 
which is in line with Section 10(b)’s origins and evolution, and may raise the 
quality and success of securities fraud suits brought while funneling other 
meritorious cases to more appropriate sections of the securities laws.  People 
bring lawsuits for myriad reasons; if securities fraud is positioned to pursue the 
morally blameworthy, other causes of action may become simpler paths for 
pursuing compensation. 
a. Morality as a Judicial Tool in Recklessness Assessments 
The broadest advantage that the moral dimension of civil securities fraud 
provides is that it offers a lens by which to assess whether pleadings or evidence 
satisfy the recklessness standard.  If the pleading or evidence evinces morally 
blameworthy behavior—a defendant not only not knowing and not caring about 
the truthfulness of the statement made, but doing so in a way clearly at odds 
with surrounding social norms—a judge can take some comfort in beginning 
from the premise that recklessness exists.224  In other words, moral 
blameworthiness can act as an interpretative tool for judges deciding whether 
behavior satisfies the recklessness standard. 
Judge Jed Rakoff has made a similar argument in the criminal context, 
explaining that recklessness, confusing in the abstract, can be “a useful 
 
223. Olazábal & Abril, Recklessness, supra note 216, at 329. 
224. Cf. Kuehnle, supra note 64, at 170–71 (contrasting heightened negligence recklessness and 
fraud recklessness historically, and identifying the latter as “reflect[ing] a moral deficiency”). 
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concept” if “tied to its moorings . . . in moral culpability.”225  He asserts that 
despite the special problems the question of intent can raise in securities fraud, 
overall, “judges and juries have little difficulty in determining intent in most 
cases.”226  The exception, he says, is recklessness, whose definition, even if 
comprehensible, is often “a little too vague, a little too manipulable” to 
encompass behavior it should not.227  The dividing line, rather, is moral 
culpability.228  Individuals who may act somewhat recklessly, but in doing so 
“adher[e] to what is essentially accepted as the social norm of their immediate 
peer group,” are not deemed culpable.229  Rather, only an individual who 
consciously disregards what her peers would immediately identify as 
inappropriately risky is morally culpable and, by extension, liable.  Without this 
last step, “you deprive the action of its moral justification.”230 
Judge Rakoff’s points are equally applicable in the civil context.  
Regardless of the specific standard a judge uses to assess recklessness within a 
scienter showing, she can use the question of moral culpability to assess 
whether that standard has been met.231 
An example on this point may prove helpful.  Let us examine a hypothetical, 
which I borrow wholesale from a work by Ann M. Olazábal and Patricia S. 
Abril: 
[Imagine a case where a] corporation issues an earnings report 
containing various misrepresentations regarding the strength of 
its soon-to-be-released—and financially critical—product line.  
In an open analyst call, the CEO suggests that the product 
launch was delayed because, in her experience, the fall buying 
season offers a more favorable marketplace.  In reality, the 
launch had been delayed because the flagship product of the 
line malfunctions frequently and tests poorly.  Evidence 
reveals that it is “common knowledge” among the company 
rank-and-file that the new product being touted as the savior 
for the failing firm is in fact a dud.  The fact is that the product 
is destined to fail, and the company has no other promising 
 
225. See Rakoff, supra note 199, at 1456. 
226. Id. at 1449. 
227. Id. at 1450–53.  Judge Rakoff offers the example of speeding on a highway when every 
other car is doing the same thing.  Id. at 1451–53. 
228. Id. at 1455–56. 
229. Id. at 1453. 
230. Id. at 1456. 
231. Samuel Buell similarly muses upon ways to use intuitions of wrongfulness to help decide 
close cases in modern crimes like fraud, and extortion.  See Buell, Culpability, supra note 192, at 600–
02. 
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products in its pipeline.  In the short term, the CEO’s 
misdirection artificially props up the stock price; but when the 
truth comes out, the stock plummets.  Injured shareholders file 
a civil suit [under section 10(b)].232 
Olazábal and Abril’s hypothetical concludes with the judge dismissing the suit 
and being upheld on appeal because there is no “smoking gun of a memo to the 
CEO detailing the product’s malfunctions.”233 
The complaint alleges that it was common knowledge at the company that 
the professed hit product is in fact a flop, and the suit was dismissed because of 
the failure of the complaint to tie that knowledge to the person making the 
statement.234  But the lack of a smoking gun does not make dismissal a foregone 
conclusion.  Rather, it leads to questions such as: What sorts of facts could a 
complaint plead in this situation to survive dismissal? And what sorts of 
findings could a judge make? 
Let us assume that the CEO cannot be shown to have actual knowledge that 
the product was a flop, and so we are in recklessness territory.  The key 
question, then, is: What degree of unawareness could the CEO have of this 
reality when making her statement that crosses the line between acceptable and 
actionable?  The answer to that question will rest on many factors, including: 
1. What information was accessible to the CEO regarding the 
 product at issue? 
a. How was that information compiled and checked for 
 accuracy? 
b. What level of expectation was there for her to review 
 that information, and how often? 
c. Did she in fact review the information in an 
 appropriate manner? 
d. Did that information raise any red flags as to the 
 soundness of the product at issue such that she 
 should be expected to investigate further? 
2. How was the CEO was prepared for the call? 
a. What information was compiled for her, and how was 
 that information checked? 
b. In preparing for the call, were any red flags  raised 
 prompting a need for further investigation or  follow-
 up? 
c. Was there any reason for follow-up after the call and 
 the statement at issue? 
 
232. See Olazábal & Abril, Recklessness, supra note 216, at 305–06 (footnote omitted). 
233. Id. at 306. 
234. Id. at 305–06. 
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3. What was the CEO’s level of contact with the company 
 rank and file? 
a. Was this contact such that the truth should have come 
 out, given her interactions? 
b. Was there any evidence that the CEO deliberately 
 shielded herself from learning the truth in some way, 
 an example of “willful blindness” actionable under 
 the securities laws? 
The inquiry, suffice to say, is vast, and particularly difficult to assess at the 
motion to dismiss stage, since no discovery has happened yet.  Recognizing the 
moral dimension of recklessness does not offer an easy solution, but rather can 
guide a judge’s assessment.  In examining each of these questions, the judge 
can bear in mind that she is looking for indications of behavior that crosses the 
line from acceptable corporate conduct to blameworthy behavior.  Reckless 
behavior on the part of the CEO will be that which sets her apart from her peer 
group.  A judge who keeps this simple point in mind can analyze the complaint 
and attendant filings with a centralizing point of inquiry. 
I am deliberately not offering a precise recklessness standard for judges to 
adopt here.  A myriad of other scholars have articulated such standards already.  
If these standards have been helpful to judges and litigants, then I have little 
more to contribute.  If these standards are not helpful, I suspect there are two 
main reasons: the often vague nature of such standards, as explicated in Part II, 
or the difficulty courts face in aligning a scholar-devised standard with their 
circuits’ own case law. 
Keeping the general idea of the morally blameworthy in mind when making 
pleading and evidentiary calls may well prove more helpful than attempting to 
apply a more precisely articulated standard.  It is more intuitive for a judge to 
consider that she is looking for a culpable state of mind than whatever precise 
(or not so precise) standard is being used in her district.  Using morality as an 
interpretive lens in the recklessness inquiry also recognizes the practicalities of 
judging; judges often use such tools to analyze and analogize how to apply 
complicated doctrine to specific facts.235 
This approach is not only helpful to judges, but good for consistency’s sake.  
Judges are bound by the precedent in their respective circuits when making 
recklessness assessments, but the moral lens both aligns with these precedents 
and offers a way to standardize them.  Judges will not be pressured to conflict 
with whatever standards already govern particular circuits, while 
 
235. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 
93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Sale, supra note 190. 
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simultaneously being able to move closer to clarity and consensus by reference 
to the moral lens.  Judges thus can make their rulings with more confidence that 
they are based on the underpinnings of the cause of action at issue and that their 
colleagues are following suit. 
Of course, many of the same scholars who discuss judges’ use of heuristics, 
or mental shortcuts, also point out the primary disadvantage of the practice: it 
can lead to systemic errors and biases.236  In the securities context, for instance, 
there is concern that busy judges encountering complex cases may gravitate 
toward heuristics that make it easier to dismiss them.  Indeed, some scholars 
allege that it is precisely the use of “instinctual reactions” that has led to the 
current state of disarray.237  
I am sympathetic to these arguments and sensitive to these criticisms.  
However, using morality as an interpretive lens is not the same thing as 
implementing a heuristic.  As demonstrated through the earlier hypothetical 
analysis, it is simply another way to engage in lengthy deliberative decision 
making, albeit with a concentrated focus.238  At its most heuristic-like, this 
interpretive lens is only a first step, not a substitution for reasoned judgment.239  
Furthermore, the riskiest types of heuristics are those that are unconscious and 
based on faulty assumptions.  The risk of bias and error in heuristics is 
minimized when judges are aware of the tools they are using and when these 
tools have a sound basis.240  That is the case here.  Judges will still need to make 
use of the standards of law and content of the complaint or evidence to show 
that the presence or absence of scienter rises above mere intuition. 
b. A Higher Recklessness Showing Requirement 
The moral dimension of civil securities fraud also serves as confirmation of 
and justification for requiring a higher showing of recklessness—one 
approaching intentionality—for liability to attach.  The mental element of 
 
236. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same 
Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY 
L.J. 83 (2002); Guthrie, supra note 235, at 29–33; Sale, supra note 190, at 906–14.  But see Donald C. 
Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated to Create “Good” Securities Fraud Doctrine?, 51 EMORY L.J. 309 
(2002) (reviewing Bainbridge and Gulati’s article and offering some criticisms). 
237. Olazábal, supra note 138, at 1442; see also Sale, supra note 190, at 909–10. 
238. To use Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s vocabulary, this is a tool to focus on System 
2 (deliberative) thinking, rather than a System 1 (automatic thinking) replacement.  See DANIEL 
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–30 (2011). 
239. Cf. Guthrie, supra note 235, at 33 (offering an example of how intuition can guide 
deliberative thought). 
240. See id. at 38–40. 
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securities fraud takes guidance from that in traditional common-law fraud, 
which, as delineated above, encompasses acts of deception that impute bad faith 
to the actor.241  If, then, those found liable for civil securities fraud will be 
labeled as deviators from accepted social norms, it makes sense to require a 
high showing for this label to attach. 
This higher showing has several beneficial implications.  First, it makes 
securities law more consistent with the trend of Supreme Court case law on the 
subject.  Second, it offers better justification for enforcing the securities laws, 
and possibly greater chance for success.  Third and finally, a higher 
recklessness showing can act as an effective check against unprincipled 
overexpansion of the securities fraud regime. 
First, and most simply, recognizing a stricter recklessness requirement puts 
the law in line with the past four decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
which has moved toward a more restrictive reading of securities fraud 
liability.242  While some criticize these decisions, all acknowledge their 
precedential status, and we should recognize their implication.  Lower court 
judges applying the securities laws can do so with raised confidence that they 
are following the path dictated by national precedent. 
Second, a higher recklessness showing encourages using securities fraud to 
go after the morally blameworthy.  This puts securities fraud in line with the 
rhetoric that lawmakers used to pass it, which strengthens the rationale for 
expending governmental resources on such cases.  Even more importantly, 
pursuing the morally blameworthy may lead to a better investigative process 
and more satisfying results.  Securities fraud investigations and lawsuits are 
often very long, involve hundreds of filings, and result in settlements that 
contain no acknowledgment of culpability.  Many have expressed frustration 
with how little clarity settlements in particular offer regarding who is 
culpable.243  Premising liability on culpability makes it more likely that 
administrative or judicial proceedings will undertake the sort of inquiry into 
wrongdoing that can countermand these tendencies, offering at least part of the 
reckoning called for by so many.244 
 
241. See supra Section II.B. 
242. See Fallone, supra note 146, at 112–13. 
243. See, e.g., Jason E. Siegel, Note, Admit It! Corporate Admissions of Wrongdoing in SEC 
Settlements: Evaluating Collateral Estoppel Effects, 103 GEO. L.J. 433, 455–64 (2015); James B. 
Stewart, S.E.C. Has a Message for Firms Not Used to Admitting Guilt, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2013), 
https://nyti.ms/10DRJoU [https://perma.cc/47A8-PLLZ]. 
244. As explained later, a higher showing for civil securities fraud also has helpful implications 
when considering criminal suits.  See infra Section IV.D.   
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Similarly, by making it harder for securities fraud liability to attach, a 
higher showing of recklessness can raise the percentage of successful securities 
fraud actions brought.  This may seem counterintuitive, but if a higher 
requirement is recognized, it might convince those bringing actions to limit 
themselves to those cases more likely to succeed.  This would be particularly 
advantageous in instances where the government is bringing suit.  Dan Kahan 
has pointed out that a major issue of low-certainty prosecution, even with high-
severity punishment for those convicted, “is that it is more likely to signal to 
potential law-breakers that like-situated persons are engaged in crime.”245  If 
lots of people are accused of securities fraud but never punished, the message 
sent to potential violators is that the practice is so rampant that it is both 
statistically safe to engage in and bereft of reputational costs.  Having fewer 
suits, and having those suits not be decided on popularly perceived 
technicalities like nuances of phrasing, would go a long way toward addressing 
this message, as well as the crisis of confidence in the securities laws’ efficacy. 
The incentives at play in the private sector are obviously somewhat 
different.  Private lawsuits are brought for various reasons, including earning 
vindication for a perceived wrong, convincing a defendant to change their 
policies or behavior, and seeking to develop the law in a new direction.  Many 
private lawsuits have compensation as their primary objective, and in these 
situations, so long as plaintiffs believe they are more likely than not to survive 
a motion to dismiss, they probably will continue filing securities fraud cases in 
hopes of generous settlements. 
If, however, courts reach a point where they are particularly demanding for 
securities fraud cases, it may serve as incentive for private plaintiffs to begin to 
avail themselves of other actions under the securities laws available to 
challenge misrepresentations and omissions, on the reasoning that these would 
offer better chances of success and a simpler means of achieving it.  One reason 
plaintiffs flock to Section 10(b) is that there is robust case law surrounding it, 
which provides helpful guidance on how to structure adequate pleadings.246  But 
lawyers seek efficiency, and for some cases the advantage of the known might 
well be offset by the simplicity of filing under a cause of action that did not 
require a scienter pleading.  If there is even small movement in this direction, 
the dominating role of Section 10(b) will diminish somewhat, paving a path for 
 
245. See Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 19, at 378. 
246. See, e.g., Jay B. Kasner & Mollie M. Kornreich, Section 10(b) Litigation: The Current 
Landscape, ABA (Oct. 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2014/10/03_kasner.html 
[https://perma.cc/RA27-CV4G] (summarizing recent case law for each element of Section 10(b) 
claims, much of which came from the pleading stage). 
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distinction and beneficial definition of other causes of action.247  And in the 
long run, lawsuits that require proof of fewer elements can be processed more 
quickly, easing the burden on the judiciary. 
No doubt many readers are loudly protesting that securities fraud is already 
notoriously hard to prove—Why would we want to make it even harder?  I 
emphasize, then, that if securities fraud is a pronouncement of moral 
blameworthiness—and it is—then it should be hard to prove.  The law reflects 
societal norms that target and condemn blameworthy behavior; we should be 
very sure that the individuals we are painting with such a brush deserve it.248 
The third benefit of a higher showing of recklessness is that it ensures that 
civil liability does not go too far.  Requiring proof of moral culpability prevents 
a witch hunt, where those who have been harmed by financial institutions look 
for someone to blame without due regard to whether the defendant has in fact 
acted wrongly.  Vague provisions of intent requirements risk determinations of 
liability and censure without sufficient due process.  This is particularly likely 
in fraud actions; since they are already flexible regarding the type of conduct 
they encompass, the requisite mental element has to act as the barrier.249 
Conceiving of civil securities fraud as morally blameworthy gives courts a 
tool to ensure individuals are shielded from those out for blood at any cost.  In 
doing this, it plays a role similar to the mens rea requirement in criminal law.250  
Obviously, some culpable individuals will slip through the cracks; any mental 
element will always be under-inclusive, because it is never perfectly 
discoverable.251  But given the penalties at stake, that is likely better than the 
alternative. 
D. Distinction for Judicial Definition, and a Path for Congressional 
Emendation 
Conceiving of securities fraud as morally blameworthy also clarifies its 
distinct place within the wider securities legal landscape, for purposes of 
analogizing between different sections of the law, addressing risks of 
overcriminalization, and paving the way for more principled statutory 
emendation if and when that time comes. 
 
247. We have already seen the stirrings of such movement.  Class actions alleging violations of 
Section 11 of the Securities Act, which does not require scienter, more than doubled between 2013 and 
2015, though they declined in 2016.  See Boettrich & Starykh, supra note 222, at 8. 
248. This reality also offers a partial response to the disparity between criminal and civil liability 
in the securities laws, which will be discussed in the next Section.  See infra Section IV.D. 
249. See supra notes 61–63, 107.  
250. See Buell, Culpability, supra note 192, at 586; see also supra Section II.A.2. 
251. See Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, supra note 16, at 2021. 
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As explained earlier, much of the Supreme Court’s securities fraud case law 
is premised on historical reconstruction: using textual analysis to search for the 
provision in the securities laws most analogous to whatever section is in need 
of elucidation.252  Often, the Court will consider the element in the analogous 
provision as the outside boundary, particularly when elucidating private rights 
of action.  The Court has stated that the practice promotes clarity, consistency, 
coherence, and legislative purpose.253 
This practice of analogizing continues in courts of appeals today.254  It can 
be an effective exercise, but there is always the risk that an unsuitable section 
will be used, a risk exacerbated when some factual scenarios or sections of the 
securities laws are casually classified as fraud without recognition of the 
potential consequences.  In particular, using more robust fraud sections of the 
securities laws to inform the contours of other sections where negligence or 
“weak” recklessness are the requisite states of mind may well exclude certain 
potential parties for no principled reason. 
Reinforcing that securities fraud is morally charged emphasizes that only 
those provisions with a strong mental element should be considered fraud, and 
that the presence of scienter offers strong justification to analogize between 
different provisions with that element.  It also distinguishes the 
misrepresentation provisions of the laws as a separate group with separate 
purposes, allowing for a more robust and consistent body of law to develop in 
each corner.  Samuel Buell has called SEC Rule 10b-5 “a legal Swiss army 
knife—used to punish, to enjoin, to shame, to regulate, to fine, to debar, to sue, 
to compensate, and more.”255  And thus far, “Congress has acquiesced in the 
experiment of allowing federal courts to develop a federal common law of 
securities fraud.”256  If securities fraud is morally charged and perpetrator-
focused—used for censure, punishment, and deterrence—then pronouncing its 
distinction from the securities laws in general makes it simpler for non-fraud 
cases to focus on other purposes, like ensuring full and accurate disclosures.  If 
underutilized sections of the securities laws are identified, they can be 
developed into more effective tools for a variety of purposes.  And, as explained 
 
252. See supra Section III.B.2. 
253. See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 295 (1993); Lampf, 
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 360–61 (1991); Grundfest, supra note 
113, at 312. 
254. See, e.g., Dekalb Cty. Pension Fund v. Transocean Ltd., 817 F.3d 393, 405–07 (2d Cir. 
2016) (examining which sections of the Securities and Exchange Acts a certain section most closely 
resembles in determining whether a statute of repose applies). 
255. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, supra note 97, at 540–41. 
256. Fallone, supra note 146, at 98; see also Musick, 508 U.S. at 294. 
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in Section I.B, plaintiffs will be encouraged to avail themselves of those other 
sections precisely because of the increased difficulty of pleading scienter.  From 
distinction comes refined definition. 
Similarly, recognizing the moral dimension of fraud might offer a partial 
solution to the troubling trend of overcriminalization.  In numerous areas of 
law, criminal sanctions are being used for behavior that, at first and even second 
blush, does not seem proportional.257  If the moral dimension of securities fraud 
(and other civil laws) is recognized, it becomes a more attractive avenue for 
pursuing blameworthy behavior, and thus a better alternative than a continually 
expanding body of criminal law.  In other words, the government can bring 
enforcement actions confident that success will bring with it similar benefits to 
those reaped from a criminal conviction.  Criminal actions can then in turn be 
reserved for particularly egregious behavior, or other exceptional need.258 
Recognizing the moral dimension of civil securities fraud may also serve 
as a first step toward addressing the unfortunate reality that criminal 
recklessness under the securities laws can be easier to prove than civil 
recklessness.259  Case law in the civil securities context, particularly 
surrounding mental state requirements, is often used as precedent in criminal 
securities cases as well.260  Yet courts sometimes implement a subjective 
recklessness inquiry in civil suits while implementing an objective one in 
criminal suits, taking guidance from the Model Penal Code’s definition of 
recklessness as involving “a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that 
a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”261  Recognizing 
the moral dimension of securities fraud emphasizes the closeness of the civil to 
the criminal and thus highlights this inconsistency.  Bringing the cases closer 
together is a first step toward redrawing the boundary between them. 
Finally, using the moral dimension of fraud to parse fraud sections from 
misrepresentation sections paves a path forward for more coherent and 
consistent congressional emendation.  The moral dimension of civil securities 
fraud justifies affording the law more flexibility than what usually attaches to 
other sections.  As discussed above,262 “fraud is a legal concept designed to 
adapt alongside the evolving behaviors that it targets.”263  Recognizing that 
 
257. See, e.g., Coffee, Unlawful, supra note 30, at 195–96. 
258. Cf. id. at 224–25. 
259. See Olazábal & Abril, Recklessness, supra note 216, at 327–29; supra Section IV.C.1.b. 
260. See Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal 
Regulatory Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025, 
1041–42. 
261. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1985). 
262. See supra notes 63–64, 97 and accompanying text. 
263. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, supra note 97, at 520 & n.22. 
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fraud has a moral dimension, and that notions of morality evolve—certain 
behaviors considered acceptable a century ago are horrifying to society today—
leads to the conclusion that the law can and should be updated to reflect such 
changes.  If securities fraud has become a method by which to target morally 
blameworthy behavior, lawmakers have a benchmark by which to amend the 
law to reflect changed understandings of what behavior is blameworthy.  They 
can ensure that the law remains fresh and useful and that these amendments 
cohere with the laws’ stated purposes. 
E. A New Way to Consider Fraud Prevention 
Finally, recognizing the moral dimension of civil securities fraud offers 
renewed reason to consider alternatives to litigation in addressing the 
prevention of corporate wrongdoing.  Securities fraud litigation is morally 
charged because it targets behavior departing from established social norms, 
but it is not necessarily an effective means of defining or developing those 
norms. 
It is hard to be optimistic when looking at the state of securities litigation 
today.  We are facing a landscape where hundreds of fraud actions are brought 
each year, yet few make it to trial.264  With little perceived connection between 
charging decisions and blameworthiness, those individuals (and businesses) 
that do end up being found liable appear to be victims of circumstance, or even 
scapegoats.265  Familiarity has bred skepticism on the bench, particularly where 
securities class actions are concerned.266  While this does not necessarily 
correlate to a disproportionate number of frivolous claims, it does suggest 
something is not working.  And these developments are a sure way to erode 
public faith in the ability of the securities laws to police corporate conduct. 
Even more dangerous is the effect of the current litigation landscape on 
corporate professionals.  Securities class actions make up such a 
disproportionate number of class actions (a public company has approximately 
a two percent chance of having a securities class action brought against it in any 
given year)267 that they are seen as an inevitable feature of doing business rather 
than as anything avoidable through proper behavior.  Those found liable for 
 
264. See generally Boettrich & Starykh, supra note 222, at 2–4, 41. 
265. Cf. Larkin, supra note 19, at 14 (making the same point in the criminal context). 
266. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 181, at 635–36. 
267. Thel, Taking Section 10(b) Seriously, supra note 15, at 32; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1534, 1539–40, 1548–49 (2006) [hereinafter Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action] 
(pointing out that securities class actions comprised just under 50% of all class actions pending in 
federal courts and offering factors making such lawsuits likely). 
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securities fraud are considered unlucky rather than blameworthy.268  Lack of 
peer censure makes for much less incentive to zealously work to avoid liability 
by obeying the law; the fact that individual defendants almost never contribute 
personally, relying instead on directors and officers liability insurance paid for 
by the company, doesn’t hurt either.269 
This Article devotes itself to outlining textual and interpretive shifts that 
will make for clearer, more principled, and—hopefully—more effective 
application of the securities fraud laws.  And yet, when taking a step back, it 
can be hard to see how these, or indeed any, specific reforms can address the 
larger problem.  Creating more rules to adhere to, and stricter penalties for 
violations, offers the comfort that we are doing something to address the issue, 
but brushes over the actual usefulness of such reforms.270 
We need to understand what these laws can and cannot do.  They can 
identify and police norms, but they are not a good tool for developing norms in 
the corporate community.  The moral dimension of civil securities fraud 
highlights this shortcoming, and the need to look elsewhere for solutions.  
Ronald Colombo, for instance, persuasively argues in his review of Moral 
Markets, a collection of essays that examines the role of morality in the modern 
American economy, that the solution to corporate scandal is not stricter laws, 
but the earlier inculcation of virtue.271  Other scholars have similarly chronicled 
the ways in which social norms, rather than legal rules, might be the best way 
to shape corporate behavior.272 
Even the clearest and strictest of securities laws likely could not have 
prevented recent economic upheavals.273  Instilling fear of legal censure, no 
 
268. Cf. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 19, at 350 (pointing out that in communities where 
“crime is perceived to be rampant, individuals are less likely to form moral aversions to criminality”). 
269. See Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action, supra note 267, at 1551. 
270. See Thel, Original Conception, supra note 118, at 401 (offering a similar critique of 
historical public debates about financial reform). 
271. Colombo, supra note 134, at 761–64. 
272. See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 1, at 253–73; John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-
Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2151 n.1 (2001) (collecting examples); Mark Klock, 
Improving the Culture of Ethical Behavior in the Financial Sector: Time to Expressly Provide for 
Private Enforcement Against Aiders and Abettors of Securities Fraud, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 437, 488–
93 (2011). 
273. Traditional securities fraud—lying about the value of securities when offering them for 
sale—does not appear to be the main source of the 2008 financial collapse.  The fault lies as much with 
purchasers and gatekeepers who failed to scrutinize the loans as they should as with any bad action by 
the loan originators.  Coffee, for one, places the “direction of the causality” squarely from the 
investment banks purchasing securitized loans to the loan originators.  See Coffee, What Went Wrong?, 
supra note 197, at 408; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. 
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matter how severe, can only go so far as a deterrent.  Rather, a corporate culture 
that emphasizes the commercial advantages of strict compliance in both letter 
and spirit is one to strive for.  Dan Kahan has pointed out that people’s moral 
convictions are shaped by their peers.274  If that is true, then it is not in 
courtrooms and congressional committees that the most valuable work can be 
done, but in business school classrooms and Wall Street offices. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Dan Kahan has pointed out that law is so “suffused with morality” that it 
cannot “be identified or applied . . . without the making of moral judgments.”275  
There will always be merit to examining what judgments are being made, 
particularly in a field as vast and complex as securities fraud.  With any luck, 
the specificity of this Article’s inquiry and its tangible conclusions offer some 
comfort to those who worry that we are arriving at a point where we recognize 
that the entire legal system stands on a moral foundation, leaving little reason 
to parse it in individual instances.276  The multiplicity of such exercises does 
not lessen their individual merit.  And when such assessments may shed light 
on new ways to maintain fair and efficient securities markets, the effort seems 
worthwhile. 
 
 
Can’t Come Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1272–85 (2014) (offering a more detailed account of 
the financial collapse and regulatory response). 
274. See Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 19, at 358–59. 
275. Kahan, Ignorance of Law, supra note 7, at 128. 
276. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 1 (1986).  Dworkin states that “[t]here is inevitably 
a moral dimension to an[y] action at law,” and it is the judge’s task to “decide not just who shall have 
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